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PROCEEDINGS

The Political Science Students' Conference Model

Fourth Edition

“Contemporary Discussions on Global Crises and Transformations”

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**Note from Prof. Wadouda Badran, Dean of The Faculty of Business Administration,
Economics and Political Science, The British University in Egypt:**

It is with great pleasure that I welcome you to the Political Science Conference Model (PSCM) at The British University in Egypt. As Dean of the Faculty of Business Administration, Economics and Political Science, I am delighted to see how the PSCM has evolved into a hallmark of excellence and a testament to the dedication of our political science students.

The PSCM has grown significantly over the years, culminating in its international edition for the second consecutive year. This student-led conference not only showcases the academic prowess of our students but also provides them with a platform to engage deeply with global political issues. It is truly an enriching experience that prepares our students for leadership roles in the field of political science and beyond.

I am excited about the upcoming editions of the PSCM and look forward to witnessing the continued success of this initiative.

Warm regards,

Prof. Wadouda Badran

Dean, Faculty of Business Administration, Economics and Political Science

The British University in Egypt

Note from Prof. Hadia FakhrEldin, Vice Dean for Teaching and Learning, The British University in Egypt:

I am immensely proud to welcome you to the Political Science Conference Model (PSCM) at The British University in Egypt. This student-led initiative is a shining example of the innovative spirit and academic excellence that defines our institution.

The PSCM not only highlights the unique perspectives and talents of our students but also underscores the rigorous preparation they receive through our political science programme. Our curriculum equips students with the necessary skills to navigate complex political landscapes and thrive in the competitive job market.

I commend our students for their outstanding efforts in organizing this conference and wish everyone a fruitful and enlightening experience at PSCM.

Warm regards,

Prof. Hadia FakhrEldin

Vice Dean for Teaching and Learning

The British University in Egypt

Note from Prof. Amany Khodair, Head of the Department of Political Science, The British University in Egypt:

I extend a heartfelt welcome to you to the international edition of the Political Science Conference Model (PSCM) organized by our talented students at The British University in Egypt. This student-led initiative is truly one of a kind, offering participants from diverse backgrounds a unique opportunity to engage deeply with pressing global issues.

As Head of the Department of Political Science, I am incredibly proud of the continuous growth and success of the PSCM. This conference not only showcases the academic achievements of our students but also fosters critical thinking and cross-cultural understanding.

The success story of PSCM is a testament to the robustness of our political science programme and the dedication of our students. I look forward to witnessing the insightful discussions and innovative ideas that will emerge from this conference.

Best regards,

Prof. Amany Khodair

Head of the Department of Political Science

The British University in Egypt

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Abstracts

A Critical Analysis of the Shifting Attitudes Towards the Concept of Sovereignty Since the End of the Cold War.

Harry Ollington

The redefinition of sovereignty signals a monumental shift in political and international relations theory. For centuries sovereignty was seen as a right. Bodin (2012) clarifies the idea of it being a 'right' as it is something that cannot be removed. As (Vinx, 2022) demonstrated in his reference to Hobbes, sovereignty is 'absolute'. This "right" was perceived in various ways and the application of the right was contested (Glanville, 2013) but the concept was a foundation to the establishment of the modern international structure. It's a concept that has its roots in the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 but developed over an expansive period there after (Bick, 2020). Over time the principle of non-intervention became prevalent in international politics, but over the last 30 years this has been deconstructed and replaced with the notion that sovereignty is a "responsibility", as Nell (2018) defined it "Sovereignty is a privilege not a right" (2018, p4) as he believes it comes with conditions regarding the citizens and they must be met.

The end of the Cold War was famously deemed as the "End of History (Fukuyama, 1989). This referred to a complete upheaval in the world system, a restructuring, a deviation away from traditional norms that were entrenched, one of those being traditional sovereignty. The new world order that emerged from the rubble of the cold war was an order that seemed to be more compassionate and caring. Atrocities that occurred in the decade such the Rwandan Genocide and Ethnic Cleansing in the Balkans were not ignored but were met with a "rallying call" "never again" (Whyte, 2017, p311). Non-intervention was no longer deemed acceptable or humane and so the redefinition began, brought to life with UN Secretary General Anon (1999) stating "traditional notions of sovereignty can no longer do justice to the aspirations of peoples everywhere". Even though on the surface this transformation in attitudes and thoughts was perceived as noble by the international political elite, what this research will try to uncover is what this redefinition really means for the power balance of the world.

In a time when interventionism is a dominant idea, this research is essential in questioning why? It will look to find out if by redefining sovereignty we have reversed progress and allowed for the capacity for greater monopolies on power and greater exploitation of smaller states. The problem of power will be central to the research. The project will also evaluate case studies and the success or failings of the international community acting on principles of conditional sovereignty. This will

be underpinned by the focus on the previously neglected human element of sovereignty. Arguments regarding personalized sovereignty are essential in this debate and will aid in reaching results.

Analysing ISIL's Diverse Strategies in Iraq and Syria: A Unified Ideology with Divergent Realities (2013-2019)

Perihan Abdelgawad, and Mennatullah Ahmed

diversest has consistently been perceived as an exceptionally unique region, where a mosaic of diverse identities and complexities coalesce. Simultaneously, the region confronts profound and longstanding sectarian divisions, with implications that extend significantly, impacting both regional stability and global security. In recent years, these deep sectarian fault lines have intersected with the rise and emergence of transnational terrorist groups, introducing an additional layer of complexity to the regional landscape, and fostering a very volatile environment. As a result of this intersection, a new pressing challenge has emerged for policy makers and scholars, prompting the need for collective effort to comprehend the dynamics and address the root causes of this complex intertwined phenomenon.

Consequently, this paper aims to explore the relationship between sectarianism and transnational terrorism in the Middle East through a case study approach by examining the case study of ISIL, particularly in Iraq and Syria from 2013 until their defeat in March 2019. The authors aim to answer the following question: to what extent do the enduring sectarian divisions in Iraq and Syria contribute to the emergence, growth, and sustainment of transnational terrorism. This paper argues that while ISIL's core ideology remains consistent across both countries, the impact of its recruitment, governance, and tactics varies based on the specific socio-political context of each state. The paper employs a social movement theory (SMT) lens to examine ISIL's activities, exploring how enduring sectarian divides fuel its rise and divergent strategies between Iraq and Syria.

This paper is structured into three distinct sections: the first section establishes the theoretical framework (social movement theory), providing the foundational concepts and theories underpinning the study. Moving into the second section, it delves into the main drivers behind the emergence of ISIL in Iraq and Syria, examining the socio-political, economic, and ideological factors that contributed to its rise. Then finally, the third section presents an in-depth analysis of the indicators, divided into two subsections: the vision/strategy of ISIL, outlining its overarching goals and strategic objectives, and the recruitment tactics and target audience, detailing the methods used to attract and retain followers.

Key Words: Social Movement Theory, Transnational Terrorism, Sectarianism, ISIL, Radicalization, Conflict, Middle East, Jihadist Movements.

Climate Change Impact in the Water Sector: Analysis of COP 27

Mohanned Ahmed Nada

The gap in water security and the provision of an appropriate water level has become widening due to the negative effects of human actions, such as excessive use of water or its pollution. Therefore, the countries of the world have turned to establishing the water field, setting climate change policies, and holding conferences such as the United Nations' COP 27 in 2022. The problem that the research paper discusses is the suffering of countries from climate change and the negative impact on the international countries' share of water around the world. Hence, what are the provisions, decisions, and projects that the developed countries have undertaken out of concern for the water crisis?

Due to the problem of climate change and the water crisis, the United Nations has been concerned with the climate since its establishment in 1945, and one of the affiliated organizations is the (United Nations-Water). Which aims to improve water quality, rationalize water consumption, and achieve the sixth goal of the sustainable development's seventeen goals, which is clean water and sanitation.

The research question tackles how Egypt, and the world countries are coping with the water crisis and what decisions were taken to protect their water resources from human actions and natural disasters during the COP 27 Water Day activities. The paper discusses the human aspects such as pollution and excessive water consumption and the natural aspects such as floods and snow avalanches, and how developing and developed countries deal with these disasters to conserve water.

Division of the research paper:

The research paper is divided into four parts. The first part sheds light on the relationship of water to climate change and how water quality deteriorates due to human actions, using the UN Water Commission and what are the decisions of the Paris Agreement to preserve water from climate change.

The second part is a review of academic literature to clarify the opinions of writers on climate change and how natural disasters have had a significant impact on a country's water resources. Then the paper explains the gap in the cited literature, which is the efforts of countries, especially in protecting water resources from the climate change effects, natural disasters, or human actions that are harmful to water, and how countries should create projects that support sustainable development and protect water.

The third part mentions the decisions and commitments that Egypt and the developed countries agreed upon during COP 27 regarding protection for their water resources from pollution or a decrease in the water levels and help improve water quality. More importantly, what are the goals of the Water Damages and Losses Fund?

The fourth part discusses the gray water usage project which helped Egypt and the developed countries around the world achieve the sixth goal of the sustainable development. This part includes criticism and analysis of these projects and whether these projects are good and helped achieve the Paris agreement and the sustainable development goals. Or rather, they can be developed better with innovative ideas.

Cyberfeminism: Everyday Sexism, A Gardener's Tale Lens.

Reim Sabri Elsayed Ali

“Grammar is Politics by other means” This sentence by Donna Haraway captures the essence of cyberfeminism. It is about the language that is used on the internet and how this language can show the hegemony of one sex over the other. Hence, this paper will examine the concept of cyberfeminism and the use of cyberspace to challenge notions of sexism. More particularly, it will examine it through the case of the everyday sexism movement using Gardner's tale as a theoretical framework. Although the gardener's tale was first written to explain levels of racism. however, this paper is going to use the allegory “The Gardener's Tale” to explain levels and sexism and to what extent each level is addressed. The paper asks the question: To what extent does The Gardener's Tale explain the origins and formation of sexism and to what extent does the cyberfeminism online movement “everyday sexism” help combat sexism according to the three levels of sexism in The Gardener's Tale? The study argues that there is an interplay of the three different dimensions of sexism in the gardener's tale. In addition, this same interplay should be addressed on all levels to generate an effective response to sexism. It also shows that the “everyday sexism” project was only able to address two levels which are the internalized level and the personally mediated level. Thus, the paper is going to be divided as follows: conceptual framework, theoretical framework, review of the literature, cyberfeminism as a case study, analysis through the theory, and conclusion.

Institutionalizing Climate Finance: Addressing Challenges in Small Island Developing States

Habiba Amr and Alaa Ahmed

Small Islands Developing States (SIDS) are disproportionately affected by the consequences of climate change, despite contributing to less than 1% of global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions but are bearing the full brunt of the climate crisis and are struggling to make progress across all SDGs. Effective governance plays a vital role in assisting countries in achieving their climate objectives. The aim of this paper is to examine the challenges faced by Small Islands Developing states in accessing climate finance using descriptive analysis. Climate finance governance is investigated through the lens of sustainability to examine how the existing governing bodies of climate finance affect SIDS access to climate finance. This paper concludes that the current financial architecture still works on a one-size-fits-all model which excludes Small Islands Developing States from accessing essential finance to adapt to the increasing impacts of climate change. This paper puts forward policy recommendations to enhance the efficacy of global climate finance governance to make it more inclusive.

Politicisation of intersectional feminism as a fundamental solution to the politicisation of migration: The case of Türkiye between 2015 and 2019

Rola Elzeini

Identity politics refers to “politics which groups of people having a particular racial, religious, ethnic, social, or cultural identity tend to promote their own specific interests or concerns without regard to the interests of any larger political group” (Merriam-Webster Dictionary). There are two major methods of categorizing identity politics: Common humanity and common enemy. Whereas the former form is based on solidarity built on common interests and purpose, the latter’s solidarity is built on excluding a particular enemy. Following the same line of reasoning, feminist identity politics could follow either of the two forms. With the surge of migration, several states with strong national identities witnessed waves of xenophobia towards immigrants.

Since such actions are performed against people with fragile rights with limited regulations and protection and political attempts to lessen the harsh environment of immigrants are exclusive to social services, this paper aims to identify the extent to which nationalist identity politics exacerbates xenophobia.

This paper attempts to unravel the answer to the question of: To what extent does strong nationalist identity politics aggravates anti-immigration sentiments? The paper proposes two arguments. First, strong national identity sentiments are prone to view immigrants as the common enemy, leading to exclusion and oppression of such group. Second, intersectional feminist thought strengthens the inclusivity of migrants in a receiving state and lessens the sturdiness of nationalist identity politics within a society. It, in turn, acts as a buffer zone protecting migrant women against violent waves of nationalist beliefs. The paper proposes that when feminist identity transcends nationalistic stands of people, the gendered impacts of migration are, to some extent, diluted.

The research employs a case-study qualitative research, as well as quantitative research based on content analysis from Platform X to convey a rough picture of Turkish nationalism and perceptions about Syrian refugees in Türkiye in the period between 2015 and 2019. Additionally, X Platform was specifically chosen, due to its lack of comprehensive censorship which allows for unfiltered collection of the public’s opinions (Matamoros-Fernández & Farkas, 2021).

Sino-Russian interactions amid the Ukrainian conflict: a relationship “with limits”

Ahmed Essam

The stance of China on the Russian-Ukrainian war is a subject of scholarly dispute, with some emphasizing its alignment with Russia and others highlighting its neutrality. The main objective of this study is to provide a critical analysis of China's interaction with Russia in the context of the Ukrainian war. In order to address this inquiry, the study will use insights from two theories. First, Power Transition Theory is crucial for classifying the different great powers, something that will significantly influence the nature of China's engagement with Russia. Prospect theory will build on this by explaining how the divergent power trajectories of the two countries will influence how China interacts with Russia in its war with Ukraine. The main argument of the paper is that two competing factors can explain how China interacts with Russia in the Russian-Ukrainian war. The first is China's recognition that Russia is a necessary partner in transforming the international world order. The second is the two countries' divergent power trajectories, which dictate the extent to which each is willing to take risks. These two factors will compel China to exhibit a “careful approach”, supporting Russia only in some areas and manners, while avoiding other high-risk areas that may entangle China into the conflict. Rhetorically, China showed a balanced rhetoric by emphasizing the importance of sovereignty, while simultaneously stressing the indivisibility of security and for “Russia's legitimate security concerns” to be taken seriously. Similarly, in practice, China significantly increased bilateral trade with Russia but refrained from supplying weapons to Russia or backing its nuclear activities or threats.

The impact of the Russian-Ukrainian war on the Israeli aggression: revival of Aaliyah

Laila Khaled Hussein

The Russian-Ukrainian war took place a year ago on the 24th of February. Since then, the escalation of the conflict led many Ukrainian civilians to flee and cross borders to the nearest states such as Hungary, Romania, Slovakia, etc. or even seeking refuge in other far states such as France, Germany, Italy and Israel. Under the Israeli “law of return,” Israel was able to receive thousands of Jewish Ukrainian refugees encouraging the Aaliyah (The Times of Israel, 2022; UNHCR, 2022). On the other side, 2,700 dwelling units in illegal settlements in the occupied West Bank have been granted Israeli approval (McKernan, 2022). Therefore, this paper aims to explore the relation between the Russian-Ukrainian war and the increase of the illegal Israeli settlements in the West Bank. This paper questions to what extent did the Russian-Ukrainian war impact the Israeli aggression on the Palestinians and increase the creation of settlements? Moreover, to what extent can religious and ethnic identities shape the Ukrainian Jews’ Aaliyah to Israel and the Palestinian refugees’ crisis that was even widened by the Ukrainian refugees’ crisis?

This paper uses qualitative data based on secondary sources such as academic articles, scholarly work, and international and local online news. A definition of the concepts of “Aaliyah” and the “right to return” law will be provided. The assumptions of the constructivist theory will be applied to the selected case. Therefore, this paper placed two hypotheses in order to be tested throughout the research.

H1: The Israeli government considered the Russian-Ukrainian war as a motive to encourage Aaliyah, as well as taking the Ukrainian refugees' crisis to build more settlements on the West Bank and evict more Palestinians, which widened the Palestinian displacement crisis.

H2: Religious and ethnic identities were able to shape the encouragement of the Ukrainian Jews to refute in Israel, as well as explaining the reasons behind widening the Palestinian displacement crisis

Understanding Indigenous Self-Determination in Nunavut: The Impact of Climate Change on Inuits' Culture

Enji Matar

The effect of global warming is severe on the Inuit community. There has been a focus in the literature on the impact of climate change on Inuits' health. Although, inevitably, most of these scholars explored how climate change impacts Inuits culture, the role of self-determination in this equation is omitted. This paper aims to explore the relationship between self-determination/self-governance, climate change, and culture. Therefore, it answers the following two questions: 1) what is the impact of climate change on Nunavut Inuit culture? 2) to what extent does Nunavut's degree of autonomy/self-determination increase/decrease this impact? The paper argues that climate change impacts culture negatively in Nunavut. The areas explored are hunting, fishing, language, sewing, berry-picking, and arts. The paper further argues that relying on federal resources, lack of ability to set gas prices, and colonial history undermine Nunavut's self-determination, which exacerbates the impact of climate change. However, the region has a degree of autonomy, but the territorial government does not always act in-line with the people's will. In light of Nunavut's new Devolution Agreement, the paper set a basis to conduct future research that can help assess the effectiveness of such an agreement. Although one of the study's limitations include relying on secondary data, it still contributes to the literature by adding a key variable (self-determination) to the scholarly work.

Papers

A Critical Analysis of the Shifting Attitudes Towards the Concept of Sovereignty Since the End of the Cold War.

Harry Ollington

Chapter 1: Introduction

The redefinition of sovereignty signals a monumental shift in political and international relations theory. Historically, sovereignty, defined as the “supreme legitimate authority within a territory” (Philpott, 1995, p.357), was considered a right. Bodin (2012) emphasized that a ‘right’ cannot be removed, and Vinx (2022), referencing Hobbes, described sovereignty as ‘absolute’. Although its application was contested (Glanville, 2013), sovereignty was foundational to the modern international structure. The concept originated with the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia and spread globally during the age of imperialism (Bick, 2020).

In recent decades, however, sovereignty has been reconceptualized as a “responsibility”. Nell (2018) asserted that “sovereignty is a privilege, not a right” (2018, p.4), contingent on the treatment of citizens, giving rise to the idea of contingent sovereignty. States must now meet certain conditions, like protecting human rights, to exercise sovereignty. This shift emerged post-Cold War in a more compassionate global order. Fukuyama’s (1989) concept of ‘The End of History’ symbolized a move away from traditional sovereignty. Atrocities like the Rwandan Genocide spurred a “never again” ethos (Whyte, 2017, p.311). UN Secretary-General Annan (1999) and leaders like Blair (1999) reinforced that non-intervention was no longer acceptable.

In a time when interventionism dominates, this research questions whether redefining sovereignty has led to greater monopolies on power and exploitation of smaller states. It will explore the realist issues and motivations behind this redefinition and evaluate case studies informed by principles of contingent sovereignty, emphasizing the human element of sovereignty. The study is crucial in the current geopolitical climate, where intervention calls are frequent, and the infringement on sovereignty may create new challenges.

1.1 Research Objectives

This project will analyze the problems caused by the redefinition of sovereignty, particularly debates over power dynamics resulting from pro-intervention policies. It will assess the real-world

implications through case studies, discourse analysis, and evaluating whether the redefinition facilitates power abuses.

1.2. Methodology

The research will use a critical realist theoretical framework to analyze existing literature and historical case studies, focusing on Iraq, Libya, and Syria. Critical discourse analysis will examine speeches, press releases, and interviews from leaders like Blair, Obama, Trump, and Biden to understand the narrative and its real-world impact.

1.3. Ethical Considerations

The research is low risk, relying on secondary sources without involving any study on people.

Chapter 2: Literature Review

The traditional concept of sovereignty is “supreme legitimate authority within a territory” (Philpott, 1995). Bodin (2012) describes it as ‘perpetual power’, an inalienable right. Scholars like Chowdhury and Duvall (2014) assert that sovereignty preexists all. However, Volk (2022) notes that the notion of permanent state sovereignty has faced increasing challenges since the 1990s. Glanville (2013) points out that modern sovereignty involves responsibilities, as illustrated by the UN Charter (UN, 2023). He argues that sovereignty has always entailed certain responsibilities.

The idea of ‘popular sovereignty’ emerged after the French and American revolutions, enshrining rights in their constitutions, but this internal conditionality did not extend internationally. Trachtman (2011) notes that intervention in domestic affairs was rare until recently, as the erosion of Westphalian principles accelerated. This shift raises questions. Slaughter (2005) argued for contingent sovereignty, emphasizing human security through collective measures. Nell (2018) expanded on this with his ‘Sovereignty Doctrine,’ advocating for contingent sovereignty to counter modern security threats, suggesting even state dissolutions and international trusteeships.

Moses (2013) critiques contingent sovereignty from a realist perspective, arguing it merely shifts irresponsibility to other actors, neglecting the de facto power dynamics. Holmes (1993) echoed this, criticizing international institutions as instruments of dominant states, predicting abuses of power. Terry (2015) supported this view with his evaluation of NATO’s actions in Libya, where forces exceeded their mandate for regime change.

Postcolonial critiques also emerged. Whyte (2017) compared contingent sovereignty to colonialism, accusing Western nations of overreach and paternalism toward the global south. Agnew

(2019) contends that traditional sovereignty facilitated “competitive colonialism” and was conditional on imperial power. Kendall (2017) reinforces this by tying historical power to conditional sovereignty. This complicates Whyte’s critique, suggesting traditional sovereignty was also flawed.

Stambol (2021) supports Whyte, calling sovereignty ‘Eurocentric’ and variable across contexts, challenging the Western right to impose changes. Chowdhury and Duvall (2014) argue sovereignty is based on internal agreements, highlighting individual impacts on its redefinition. Behnke (2020) refers to this as ‘personalized sovereignty,’ suggesting that individual actions are increasingly significant.

The redefinition of sovereignty is a complex theoretical issue. Contingent sovereignty is seen as morally imperative in a modern world that demands more responsibilities. However, it faces realist and postcolonial critiques, exposing its vulnerabilities. The current literature often addresses singular aspects but fails to grasp sovereignty as an intertwined concept. My research aims to bridge this gap by understanding the complex interconnections, allowing for a comprehensive evaluation of sovereignty's redefinition.

Chapter 3: The Historical Evolution of Sovereignty

The history of sovereignty and its evolution is vital to understanding its current context.

3.1. The Westphalian Model

Sovereignty was first formalized with the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, ending the 30 Years' War. This treaty introduced the idea of states having "supreme legitimate authority within a territory" (Philpott, 1995, p. 357) and established norms of non-interference in domestic affairs, as explained by Kissinger (2014). Over the centuries, debates on sovereignty evolved, especially around 'Popular Sovereignty' in the 18th century, with governments assuming responsibilities towards their people, influenced by Locke’s ‘Social Contract’ theory (Waldron, 1989). However, traditional sovereignty, linked to territorial control, became entrenched, aiding colonial powers in the 19th century (Bauder and Mueller, 2023).

3.2. The Evolution of Sovereignty during the 1990s

The 1990s brought significant change post-Cold War, challenging traditional sovereignty. Despite initial optimism, the decade also saw atrocities like the Rwandan Genocide, leading to a shift towards humanitarian intervention. Clinton’s apology for Rwanda marked a turning point towards

contingent sovereignty and doctrines like ‘Responsibility to Protect’ (Wertheim, 2010). This redefined sovereignty, prioritizing human rights over non-intervention.

Chapter 4: The Power Problem: The Role of Power in the Redefinition Debate

The power that accompanies sovereignty is immense, making it a crucial aspect of its redefinition. Before exploring the problems with power in the new definition, it must be assessed in relation to this redefinition.

4.1. Sovereignty as a Responsibility

Under the Westphalian model, power resided with state governments. However, the lack of international response to numerous genocides and inhumane acts revealed the need for treating sovereignty as a responsibility. Slaughter (2005) argues that post-UN reform in 2005, sovereignty must evolve to encompass human security, requiring fundamental changes. She proposes that power should be utilized for societal betterment, with international intervention preventing domestic abuses of power, aligning with Functionalist approaches to international relations, which promote global cooperation and governance.

In the new definition, power is linked to international community actions, with international institutions holding collective power to ensure accountability and responsible exertion of power. Nell’s (2018) ‘Sovereignty Doctrine’ supports this, advocating for international responses to ‘Failed States’ by restructuring control mechanisms. Though extreme, such measures are deemed necessary to address modern security threats. This new definition suggests that progressing international governance will allow for collective action against power abuses.

However, realist critiques challenge this optimistic view.

4.2. The Realist Issue with Sovereignty as a Responsibility

Realism, which frames this research, critiques the idealistic transfer of power to international bodies. Moses (2013) scrutinizes the credibility of contingent sovereignty through ‘de facto’ power, referring to actual political authority and power dynamics present in reality. He argues that international bodies are biased, and states do not possess equal power within them, making neutral and fair execution of contingent sovereignty principles impossible.

Tony Blair's discourse (1999) exemplifies this imbalance, as his commitment to globalization often serves national interests rather than global governance. Blair's rhetoric suggests that more global governance increases power and control for powerful states, perpetuating the risk of power abuse. Holmes (1993) supports this, arguing that states will only cooperate if it serves their interests, and the UN remains an 'instrument' of nation-states. Thus, transferring power to international institutions does not eliminate the risk of abuse but shifts it to a larger scale.

Reform, often proposed as a solution, faces significant obstacles. Gould and Rablen (2017) note the rarity of international reform, citing the lack of progress by the UN working group on Security Council reform since 1993. Major powers' resistance to reform, as it may diminish their power, further complicates this issue.

4.3. A Return to Empire: The Postcolonial Critique of the Redefinition

Postcolonial critiques compare the new sovereignty approach to colonialism, arguing it is Eurocentric and ignores non-Western nations' circumstances. Whyte (2017) and Stambol (2021) highlight that developed nations often use the lack of force monopoly and accountable justice systems as reasons for sovereignty infringement, without acknowledging the diversity of state circumstances.

Obama's discourse perpetuates this Eurocentric narrative, promoting Western principles as universal. This enforcement of a universal standard disregards the diversity in global cultures and societal structures. Agnew (2019) complicates this debate, suggesting that traditional sovereignty also maintained colonial power dynamics. Sovereignty, whether traditional or contingent, has consistently facilitated power abuses.

Trump's opposition to internationalism underscores these critiques. His call for patriotism and rejection of globalism highlights the imposition of Western ideals through international governance. His actions, such as withdrawing from the World Health Organization and the Paris Climate Agreement, exemplify resistance to a system designed to solidify Western power.

In conclusion, while the redefinition of sovereignty aims to address modern security threats through international cooperation, it faces significant realist and postcolonial critiques. These critiques highlight the persistent power imbalances and the risk of neocolonialism, suggesting that without substantial reform, the new definition may perpetuate the very issues it seeks to resolve.

Chapter 5: Case Studies: The Redefinition in Practice

To capture the complexities of the debate within a realist framework, case studies such as the 2003 Iraq war and the interventions in Libya (2011) versus the inaction in Syria must be analyzed. These instances highlight the redefinition of sovereignty and the accompanying international debates over state sovereignty.

5.1. Iraq

The US-led invasion of Iraq in March 2003 aimed to topple Saddam Hussein, driven by fears of his nuclear ambitions. Blair asserted it was “beyond doubt” (BBC, 2023) that Hussein was pursuing nuclear weapons. Despite these claims, the invasion has since been framed as a mission for freedom and rights, given Hussein’s brutal regime, which included torture, executions, repression, and chemical attacks on Kurds (Zadeh and Shafiee, 2017). These actions violated the responsibilities of sovereignty, suggesting that Iraq’s sovereignty was compromised, and intervention was necessary to restore order.

However, the UN did not authorize the invasion, and Secretary-General Kofi Annan labeled it “illegal” (BBC, 2004). This disregard for the UN illustrates a realist critique: global governance can be ignored by powerful states, undermining the principles central to the redefinition of sovereignty. This is further complicated by the lack of a clear criterion for intervention, as Binder’s research (2015) indicates that each case must be individually assessed. This ambiguity allows states to manipulate the norm of intervention to further their interests, highlighting a clash between *realpolitik* and the constructed norm of contingent sovereignty.

The invasion also demonstrated that the abuse of power was not eradicated but shifted to US coalition forces, as evidenced by Amnesty International’s reports (2013) of human rights abuses and the UN’s findings on Guantanamo Bay. This supports Moses’s (2013) theory that the redefinition of sovereignty enables new forms of power abuse.

5.2. Libya vs. Syria

The UN supported military action in Libya in 2011 (BBC, 2011) to protect citizens from Gaddafi’s regime, which was repressing an uprising. However, the UN has never intervened in Syria’s civil war, where Assad’s regime has similarly brutalized its population. Russia and China’s repeated vetoes prevented action in Syria (BBC, 2017), contrasting with the intervention in Libya.

Terry (2015) argues that NATO overstepped its mandate in Libya, targeting Gaddafi's regime rather than merely preventing civilian deaths. Brockmeier et al. (2015) support this view, suggesting NATO prioritized regime change over other solutions. Conversely, Dunne and Gifkins (2011) contend that Australia's support for intervention was purely humanitarian, aiming to promote internationalism.

Ramutsindela (2009) offers another perspective, suggesting Gaddafi's ambitions for an African Federation threatened the interests of powerful states. His anti-establishment policies and potential to unite Africa against exploitation posed a significant threat. The removal of Gaddafi preserved the economic interests of powerful nations, exemplifying neocolonialism, and the realist critique of sovereignty redefinition.

In contrast, Assad did not pose a similar threat. Syria's geopolitical significance was not as substantial, and Assad's regime did not challenge the power structures of influential states. The differential responses to Libya and Syria underscore the realist perspective that powerful states use the redefinition of sovereignty to maintain control and influence, echoing the dynamics of the colonial era. This reinforces the theoretical critiques of sovereignty redefinition, demonstrating its potential for abuse and manipulation by dominant states

Chapter 6: The Human Element of Sovereignty

The often-neglected human element is central to the debate around sovereignty. Individuals are key in redefining and implementing sovereignty, and their impact cannot be disregarded.

6.1. The Power and Influence of Individuals within the Redefinition

Behnke (2020) illustrates that sovereignty can be infringed by individual decisions, such as a US President authorizing a drone strike. This "Personalized sovereignty" emphasizes the moral aptitude of leaders in shaping sovereignty. While norms and practices involve collective input, enforcement often rests with a select few, raising questions about ethical decision-making. Hermann (2017) argues that emotional motivations hinder rational decisions, suggesting that leaders act in the interest of their nation, even abusing power. Guibernau (2009) supports this, noting that national attachment influences decision-making, challenging the rationality assumed in international politics.

The delicate nature of the new sovereignty definition, reliant on rationality, is unrealistic due to emotional influences. This fosters power abuses, as leaders act emotionally in their state's interest. Biden's foreign policy shifts illustrate individual influence on sovereignty, contrasting Trump's

traditional sovereignty narrative. Biden's actions show how leaders can shape public perception and international norms.

The human element, rooted in self-interest, is crucial in theoretical critiques of sovereignty. Realist and postcolonial critiques assume self-interest dominates, applicable only when considering the human element. These theories underscore that imperfect human behaviour is a significant challenge in redefining sovereignty, enabling power abuses in the current international order.

Chapter 7: Conclusion

7.1. Key Findings

Research into the concept of sovereignty has produced significant results, highlighting three key aspects:

- The interconnected nature of redefining sovereignty.
- The importance of the human element in this redefinition.
- The manifestation of theoretical critiques in real-world contexts

These aspects are crucial for understanding whether the redefinition of sovereignty has facilitated abuses of power.

A major issue identified in existing literature is the one-dimensional analysis of sovereignty. Scholars often focus on a single element, neglecting the correlations with other aspects. This incomplete analysis fails to provide a comprehensive understanding of sovereignty. This research uncovers the strong associations between multiple aspects of the redefinition. For instance, realist critiques help explain the emergence of postcolonial critiques, as dominant states use their power to control less developed nations. Each critique relies on others for validation, so analyzing them in isolation limits the understanding of their wider implications.

Another key finding is the critical importance of the human element in sovereignty. Often ignored, human nature and behavior are essential to the debate. Applying a critical realist framework reveals that decisions to infringe on sovereignty are made by individuals driven by self-interest and greed. Politics is driven by emotion rather than ethical rationality, making it unrealistic to expect actors to apply the redefinition morally without considering self-benefit. Self-interest lays the foundation for theoretical critiques to be applied in real-world contexts.

The manifestation of theoretical critiques in reality is evident through case studies like Iraq, Libya, and Syria. The Iraq case exemplifies how powerful states avoid international rulings, aligning with Moses' (2013) theories on war crimes by US-led coalition forces. Libya and Syria highlight neocolonialism, with interventions driven by ulterior motives. The case studies show that theoretical critiques are not abstract but have real implications.

Discourse analysis also supports this, revealing inconsistencies in narratives about the redefinition. Leaders reference self-interest and power retention, aligning with theoretical critiques.

In conclusion, the redefinition of sovereignty has facilitated abuses of power. Understanding the human element and applying theoretical critiques to real situations reveals that larger states exploit this redefinition to strengthen their dominance. This shift has led to greater inequality and more abuses of power, as powerful states leverage their positions to further their own agendas, often at the expense of weaker nations. The redefinition has thus exacerbated global power imbalances, resulting in more inequality and abuses of power.

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Analysing ISIL's Diverse Strategies in Iraq and Syria: A Unified Ideology with Divergent Realities (2013-2019)

Perihan Abdelgawad, and Mennatullah Ahmed

Introduction:

The Middle East has consistently been perceived as an exceptionally unique region, where a mosaic of diverse identities and complexities coalesce. Simultaneously, the region confronts profound and longstanding sectarian divisions, with implications that extend significantly, impacting both regional stability and global security. In recent years, these deep sectarian fault lines have intersected with the rise and emergence of transnational terrorist groups like the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), introducing an additional layer of complexity to the regional landscape, and fostering a very volatile environment. As a result of this intersection, a new pressing challenge has emerged for policy makers and scholars, prompting the need for collective effort to comprehend the dynamics and address the root causes of this complex intertwined phenomenon.

This paper aims to explore the relationship between sectarianism and transnational terrorism in the Middle East by examining the case study of ISIL, particularly in Iraq and Syria from 2013 until their defeat in March 2019. The authors aim to answer the following question: to what extent do the enduring sectarian divisions in Iraq and Syria contribute to the emergence, growth, and sustainment of transnational terrorism. This paper argues that while ISIL's core ideology remains consistent across both countries, the impact of its recruitment, governance, and tactics varies based on the specific socio-political context of each state. The paper employs a social movement theory (SMT) lens to examine ISIL's activities, exploring how enduring sectarian divides fuel its rise and divergent strategies between Iraq and Syria. By operationalizing key elements—vision/strategy, recruitment tactics, and consequences, the paper underscores how ISIL adapts to local contexts, exacerbating tensions and destabilizing the region by exploiting sectarian grievances through framing their actions as defending their sect or seeking retribution to recruit and justify violence.

Theoretical Framework: Social Movement Theory:

Social movements have been defined as “collective challenges, based on common purposes and social solidarities, in sustained interaction with elites, opponents, and authorities.” (Marsden, n.d.) Sometimes considered under the wider rubric of contentious politics, SMT analyses social movements via a tripartite framework, incorporating mobilising resources, political opportunities, and framing. (McAdam & McCarthy & Zald, n.d.)

Although previously neglected in the terrorism field, SMT is continuously applied in this area. (Hafez, 2003) Described as “one of the most consistent attempts to devise a more neutral, objective set of theoretical tools to analyse movements,” (Meijer, 2005; Gunning, 2009) As it incorporates micro, meso and macro levels of analysis, SMT is an ideal theoretical framework for contextualising terrorism and political violence in its socio-political setting. (Beck, 2008) These features make it an ideal candidate to guide typological development as Donatella della Porta (1992) suggests “Not only do underground organizations differ according to their goals, they also have varying organizational models and favor different forms of action.”

The common definitional elements of terrorism include the use of violence or threat of violence for political purposes, a differentiation between the victim of an attack and the ultimate target that terrorists seek to influence, and the indiscriminate targeting of civilians.(Nielsen, 2008) These elements contribute to the understanding of terrorism as a form of contentious politics by highlighting its political nature and the strategic use of violence to achieve political goals. By framing terrorism as a mode of collective action, it allows for the analysis of terrorist groups as movements with political claims. (Olesen & Khosrokhavar, 2009) This perspective emphasizes the political claims and goals of terrorist organizations, their mobilization of resources, and their sustained interaction with elites, opponents, and authorities. (Olesen & Khosrokhavar, 2009)

Marsden (2014) and Klandermans and Steklenburg (2009) outline a comprehensive framework for social movement theory, consisting of seven key elements: grievances, resource mobilization, political opportunity structure, collective identity, framing, mobilizing structures, and repression or resistance. Social movements typically arise in response to perceived injustices across political, economic, social, or cultural spheres, leading to collective action and resistance against repression. Mobilizing resources, such as funding and personnel, is vital for successful movements, along with navigating political opportunity structures that shape the socio-political context. Shared collective identity fosters solidarity among participants, while framing strategically represents grievances and goals to mobilize support. Mobilizing structures encompass the organizational tactics and networks used by movements to coordinate actions and exert influence, ranging from formal organizations to grassroots networks and online platforms. Understanding these elements is crucial for analysing the trajectories and outcomes of social movements. (Klandermans & Stekelenburg, 2009; Marsden,2014)

It is important to point out that there is no universally applicable theory and methodology in studying terrorism and political violence. While SMT primarily focuses on movements within

domestic contexts, this paper uniquely expands the scope of the theory beyond movements within domestic contexts to encompass transnational movements (more uniquely: a terrorist group) that operate across borders and influence multiple regions, thereby enhancing its applicability to contemporary global challenges. SMT offers a framework for analysing terrorism, considering it as a form of contentious politics akin to other social movements. (Beck, 2008) This perspective underscores the similarities in the organizational dynamics and challenges faced by terrorist groups. (Marsden, n.d.) Emphasizing that terrorism operates within a broader political opportunity structure, the theory highlights the role of framing in justifying terrorist actions and articulating goals. (Kernan, 2017) It also addresses collective identities, network structures, and the impact of movement cycles and state repression on radical militancy. (Nielsen, 2008) Additionally, social movement theory provides insights into transnational terrorism, including modular collective action, movement diffusion, and international influences. (Beck, 2008) It advocates for a comprehensive examination of the outcomes and effects of political violence, transcending the immediate changes resulting from individual campaigns. (Beck, 2008)

When looking into the theory, two significant approaches could be identified as closely related to the phenomena of transnational terrorism: political opportunity model, and network approach. (Nielsen, 2008) Starting with the political opportunity model of movements emphasizes the broader political environment's role in fostering or suppressing militant activity. (Beck, 2008; Nielsen, 2008) It suggests that movements arise from resource mobilization, and political or social conditions are conducive to contention. (Beck, 2008; Nielsen, 2008) It highlights how unstable environments lacking effective central authority can provide opportunities for militants to operate. Specific political events can also spur collective action, regardless of actual opportunities. (Beck, 2008; Nielsen, 2008) However, it is important to point out that this perspective might not fully account for the internal dynamics and conflicts within terrorist groups and social movements in general, such as leadership disputes and factionalism, which affects the movements' resource allocation and strategic decisions.

When it comes to network approaches focus on the structure and impact of terrorist networks to understand how they mobilize and persist. (Nielsen, 2008) Contemporary international terrorism often adopts a network form, comprising independent operational cells interconnected by key operatives. (Nielsen, 2008) Terrorist networks play a vital role in commitment and recruitment. Individual commitment is crucial for sustained violence, and network connections enhance solidarity and conflict intensity. (Marsden, n.d.) They employ recruitment methods, such as recruiting

acquaintances or relatives, and the emergence of new cells from existing connections. Stronger ties among terrorists may lead to heightened reprisals against state actions. (Marsden, n.d.)

It is important to note that SMT frequently portrays movements as essentially immobile entities with clear phases of emergence, mobilization, and deterioration. However, movements are frequently spontaneous and dynamic and tend to evolve as a reaction to changing circumstances. (Maher et al, 2019)

The Main Drivers behind the emergence of ISIL in Iraq and Syria:

ISIL has exerted an immense and varied influence in both Syria and Iraq. The earlier context of sectarianism and ethnic differences, along with the US and NATO powers' military involvement and alliance of Sunni Arab tribes that suppressed militant jihadis, all had an impact on the organization's presence in Iraq. On the other hand, the dynamics of the Syrian revolt and the country's conversion into a battlefield for jihadist groups shaped the influence of ISIL in Syria (Stansfield, 2016; Kernan, 2017). As a result, ISIL's strategies in both states differed in terms of some factors including motives and the consequences of such strategies given the different contexts of both countries, in which ISIL developed.

The group first appeared in Iraq as a reflection of Sunni-led insurgency, portrayed from the group al-Qaeda in Iraq efforts to repress violent jihadis. The marginalization of the Sunni population and the predominance of Shi'a parties in the political system contributed to its rise in the region (Stansfield, 2016). Sunnis became marginalized and detached from the nation's ruling structures because of this sectarian dynamic, which resulted in severe fragmentations and tension, and this was further exacerbated by the 2010 parliamentary elections (Stansfield, 2016).

In Syria, the emergence of ISIL was intertwined with the Syrian revolution and the transformation of the country into a battleground for jihadist organizations. The impact of ISIL in Syria has been characterized by its strong hold over significant segments of popular sentiment and territory, alongside other jihadist groups such as Nusra and Ahrar al-Sham. The organization's presence in Syria has further exacerbated the conflict and attracted foreign fighters, bolstering its long-term potential and threat (Abu Rumman, 2020).

Military interventions from superpowers namely, U.S., NATO, and Russia in both states further exacerbated the already intense political turmoil, manifested in the intense sectarian conflicts in Iraq, and the anti-Assad regime movements in Syria. As a result, it has provided the very fertile context that ISIL sought to establish itself in. Civil wars, transnational terrorism, and military

interventions can often influence each other in significant ways. (Crenshaw, 2020) Civil wars can open a door for transnational terrorist networks to exploit local struggles, extending the global reach of violent extremism.

Moreover, foreign military intervention can lead to the escalation of civil war and transnational terrorism through providing a political opportunity for transnational terrorist networks to establish operational bases and launch transnational campaigns in a state of power vacuum. (Crenshaw,2020) When it comes to Iraq, the U.S. invasion in 2003 deteriorated political stability in the country, accompanied by the fall of Saddam's regime, leading to the growth of militant organizations, and later the establishment of ISIS in Iraq in 2013.(RAND Cooperation, 2022) And when it comes to Syria, ISIL focused on exploiting the power vacuum created by the civil war to establish control over territory, particularly in the eastern side of the country. (RAND Cooperation, 2022)

The developing separation between Sunni and Shi'a communities is an evidence of the sectarian impact of ISIL in both Syria and Iraq. Sectarian tensions have been intensified in Iraq by the marginalization of the Sunni population and the rise of Shi'a parties, while in Syria the organization's existence has exacerbated divisions between various religious and ethnic communities (Speckhard et al. 2020). Additionally, the language of ISIL presents Sunni and Shia Muslims in a sectarian-driven dichotomy, characterizing Sunnis as "masters" and "esteemed" and condemning Shia as rejectionist.

For strategic and political purposes, ISIL generates high sectarian feelings and revives historical divisions throughout the Muslim world by using offensive terminology like *rāfiḍah* to characterize the Shia and discredit the Alawites in Syria (Abdulmajid, 2022).

This shows how the radicalization that is constructed in ISIL's language and ideology has further contributed to more sectarian divisions manifested in violence in the region leading to forceful population displacement in both countries.

Moreover, the motives of the recruited people in Iraq and Syria also differ. In Syria, foreign soldiers were attracted to the country by a desire to support the Syrian people militarily and humanitarily (Speckhard et al. 2020). Regarding the Syrian population, many were motivated to join ISIL in a quest for survival due to vulnerabilities such as unemployment, poverty, and failed nation states.

On the contrary, in Iraq, to convince potential recruits to go and join ISIL, recruitment strategies included fabricating information about the situation happening on the ground. ISIL presented the hijrah as the required migration of Muslims to live under the Caliphate and shariah law to achieve protection, prosperity, and a sense of personal value and belonging. Also, the emergence of ISIL from the beginning was accompanied by the participation of several Iraqi military officials due to the sectarian and political turmoil that were already heavily present (Speckhard et al. 2020).

While the motives to join ISIL differed in both states, whether being grounded in empathy, fabricated obligation, quest for survival, or a need to project oneself within a deeply divided ethnic community, ISIL's vision, strategy, and recruitment tactics remained remarkably consistent in both Iraq and Syria. In both scenarios, ISIL has strategically positioned itself as an alternative to the failing nation-states in Iraq and Syria to fill in the void, by effectively providing security, infrastructure, food, water, and electricity, elements which the national governments have faltered. (Kernan, 2017)

Indicators:

Vision/ Strategy:

ISIL's motives in Syria and Iraq are multifaceted, driving them to employ diverse methods to achieve their goals. Despite that their visions in both states are practically identical, however the starting point of their emergence in both states differs. ISIL has taken the opportunity to capitalize on people's emotions of marginalization, discrimination, and anger. In Iraq, the Sunni dilemma serves an important role in comprehending the environment and factors through which ISIL emerged, particularly in dealing with increased Iranian influence during the 2003 occupation (Abu Rumman, 2020). This manipulation has even succeeded in recruiting officials from the Iraqi Army and Baath party (Abu Rumman, 2020). Furthermore, the collapse of the Iraqi army and the restriction imposed on its troops from working in the security services created a fertile environment that succeeded ISIL's recruitment process (Abu Rumman, 2020).

On the other hand, in Syria the emergence of ISIL was due to the issue of political legitimacy that was associated with the Syrian government which generated emotions of marginalization and outrage. Thereby creating an atmosphere for extremism to thrive which led to facilitating the recruitment process (Abu Rumman, 2020). The establishment and evolution of ISIL in Syria may be traced to these elements as well as its capacity for adaptation, reconfiguration, and strategy shifting (Abu Rumman, 2020).

The strategic goals of ISIL involved many aspects including constructing a Caliphate in Iraq and the Levant, spreading Sharia law and Islam throughout the world, and reviving the glory of Sunni

Islam. Along with gaining legitimacy as Mohammed's successors, they also want to be acknowledged as the head of the Islamic State and Jihad (John et al. 2016). Additionally, ISIL aimed to establish a strict and clear version of Islam; it placed less importance on working with moderate Islamic organizations in favour of radicalizing and aligning supporters while gaining control of other Islamic movements (John et al. 2016).

Furthermore, part of the extremism and radicalization that ISIL holds comes from their aim to eliminate Anti-Islamic Forces across the globe, and establish a new system that may save the future of the Muslim world. This goal is directly linked to the strategic goal of spreading Sharia law and Islam throughout the world (John et al. 2016).

To accomplish its objectives, ISIL has used a variety of techniques and strategies, including establishing a virtual caliphate model, manipulating regional and global political situations, and using recruiting and media initiatives (Abu Rumman, 2020). Additionally, ISIL uses other strategies such as seizing, protecting, and expanding territory, and offering military leadership and resources, conquering other Islamic groups, radicalizing, and uniting supporters. Moreover, they intentionally utilize violence and showcase their military power to terrorize civilians and military opponents and project an image of radicalism and harshness. (Siebert et al., 2016).

However, it is important to note that the version of Islam and Sharia law that ISIL holds is an extremist version that does not represent true Islam and their radical vision of Islam and their interpretation of the Quran and Hadith will be further analysed in the recruitment section, highlighting the extent of their extremism and how this has led to sectarianism and further fed their vision.

Recruitment Tactics and Target Audience:

As mentioned before, one of the main strategies that ISIL adopts to achieve their objectives is utilizing online platforms and adopting different recruitment strategies such as resorting to ideological narratives to attract large numbers of fighters from different areas (Abu Rumman, 2020). ISIL adopted a unique strategy when it came to its recruitment process; it adopted a “grass-root horizontal framework” which refers to mobility and practicality of the process (Abu Rumman, 2020). The common way of recruiting members in ISIL was for the members to submit a video praising and approving of the caliph and engaging in violent behaviour like assaulting people in public areas (Abu Rumman, 2020). This method of recruitment shows the strong capacity of ISIL to recruit people from a variety of backgrounds and promptly incorporate them into its membership (Abu Rumman, 2020). ISIL has also effectively utilized social media for propaganda and recruitment, capitalizing on its broad reach and direct communication capabilities.

The utilization of media platforms was crucial for ISIL to project their extremist ideology, recruitment materials, and graphic content to attract more members. For instance, in Syria, recordings of Bashar Al Assad's crimes and Muslims pleading for external assistance severely disturbed viewers, especially foreign soldiers (Speckhard et al. 2020). This propaganda mechanism inspired “lone wolf” attacks worldwide, which are individual acts of violence carried out independently without any direct coordination or explicit instruction from a terrorist organization, showcasing the dangerous potential of extremist movements in the digital age. (Kernan, 2017)

ISIL has used official websites and media outlets as their basic data resources and initiate their own media outlets such as Dabiq Magazine, Al-Hayat Media Centre, al-Furqan Foundation for Media Production and Al-Naba to release statements, videos, or any kind of data they want to publish (Abdulmajid, 2022). Additionally, one of the key elements that ISIL used to attract more members and project their radicalization was using “linguistic and contextual practices” (Abdulmajid, 2022). ISIL constructs its speeches by using Sunni-based themes such as promoting the idea of the caliphate to approach and impact the sentiments of Sunni Muslims across the globe. (Abdulmajid, 2022). This was also apparent in their efforts to attract Muslims from across the globe to fight with them; particularly they aimed to attract isolated individuals or fragmented smaller units throughout the so-called enemy nations (Abdulmajid, 2022). This strongly highlights how the ideology of ISIL has solid roots in religious extremism and this was shown in the way they interpret the Quran and Hadith to promote specific themes that serve their extremist views and thereby attracting more members such as emphasizing on the right and legitimacy in restoring the caliphate and guiding the Muslims (Abdulmajid, 2022).

Furthermore, it shows how ISIL aimed to alter meanings of verses in the Quran to achieve their radical objectives. Additionally, their extreme language has a major role in feeding sectarianism as using terminology such as “jihād, ṭāgūt, nifāq, and takfir” revealed the Salafi-Jihadi base and demonstrated religious extremism as a cornerstone of ISIL’s philosophy (Abdulmajid, 2022).

There are also material elements and incentives that ISIL used to attract individuals. As mentioned before the breakout of ISIL in Iraq and Syria was because of sectarian issues, legitimacy crisis, nearly failed systems which resulted in unstable living conditions, mainly, inequality and poverty. At this point ISIL managed to use incentives such as money to persuade others to join them; it pays \$400 a month as a minimum to its militants, more for those with military experience (Smith, 2015). This marks an effective way to attract individuals who feel marginalized and angry towards their circumstances and those who experience poverty. Thus, the only way to live a decent life is to join them.

Conclusion:

To conclude, it has become evident that while the group maintains a unified vision, its tactics and impacts vary significantly due to the distinct socio-political landscapes of Iraq and Syria. ISIL has sustained itself as an alternative to failed secular nation states, and it has capitalized on the deep-rooted sectarian tensions, framing their actions within the context of defending or avenging their sect, to further its agenda and recruit supporters. However, the divergent strategies employed by ISIL in Iraq and Syria highlight the importance of nuanced analysis and tailored counterterrorism efforts to address the unique challenges posed by the group in each context. However, it is important to point out the transnational dimension of ISIL, which extends beyond the Middle East to encompass the recruitment of Muslims from European countries such as France, Belgium, Germany, and the UK, as well as Far East Asian countries like China. ISIL's distinctive approach involves marketing the concept of criminology in a 'halal', legitimate manner to individuals with previous imprisonment or adventurous tendencies, setting it apart from al-Qaeda, which prompts us as academics for a very important area for future investigation.

Accordingly, the authors emphasize the necessity of collaborative efforts among policymakers, scholars, and regional actors to tackle the intertwined issues of sectarianism and terrorism in the Middle East. We advocate for the development of comprehensive strategies aimed at addressing the root causes of these phenomena to establish lasting stability and security in the region.

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Climate Change Impact in the Water Sector: Analysis of COP 27

Mohanned Ahmed Nada

The introduction:

The gap in water security and the provision of an appropriate water level has become widening due to the negative effects of human actions, such as excessive use of water or its pollution. Therefore, the countries of the world have turned to establishing the water field, setting climate change policies, and holding conferences such as the United Nations' COP 27 in 2022. The problem that the research paper discusses is the suffering of countries from climate change and the negative impact on the international countries' share of water around the world. Hence, what are the provisions, decisions, and projects that the developed countries have undertaken out of concern for the water crisis?

Due to the problem of climate change and the water crisis, the United Nations has been concerned with the climate since its establishment in 1945, and one of the affiliated organizations is the (United Nations-Water). Which aims to improve water quality, rationalize water consumption, and achieve the sixth goal of the sustainable development's seventeen goals, which is clean water and sanitation.

The research question tackles how Egypt, and the world countries are coping with the water crisis and what decisions were taken to protect their water resources from human actions and natural disasters during the COP 27 Water Day activities. The paper discusses the human aspects such as pollution and excessive water consumption and the natural aspects such as floods and snow avalanches, and how developing and developed countries deal with these disasters to conserve water.

Division of the research paper:

The research paper is divided into four parts. The first part sheds light on the relationship of water to climate change and how water quality deteriorates due to human actions, using the UN Water Commission and what are the decisions of the Paris Agreement to preserve water from climate change.

The second part is a review of academic literature to clarify the opinions of writers on climate change and how natural disasters have had a significant impact on a country's water resources. Then the paper explains the gap in the cited literature, which is the efforts of countries, especially in protecting water resources from the climate change effects, natural disasters, or human actions that

are harmful to water, and how countries should create projects that support sustainable development and protect water.

The third part mentions the decisions and commitments that Egypt and the developed countries agreed upon during COP 27 regarding protection for their water resources from pollution or a decrease in the water levels and help improve water quality. More importantly, what are the goals of the Water Damages and Losses Fund?

The fourth part discusses the gray water usage project which helped Egypt and the developed countries around the world achieve the sixth goal of the sustainable development. This part includes criticism and analysis of these projects and whether these projects are good and helped achieve the Paris agreement and the sustainable development goals. Or rather, they can be developed better with innovative ideas.

Water problem and climate change:

United Nations Water. (2021) emphasized the sixth goal, as countries of the world must be keen on it. Firstly, natural factors such as floods and forest fires lead to drought, so all members of society are required to protect their water resources because this phenomenon threatens the sustainable development, access to appropriate sanitation, and biodiversity.

Water is linked to climate in that the snow avalanche destroys the available freshwater areas for the population of Dim regions, so the ice caps melt. Moreover, flooding may damage latrines and sewage filtration areas. Forest fires lead to the erosion of vegetation, which reduces the usage and benefit of groundwater, which destabilizes the balance of food security. So, in the future, the committee confirmed that in 2050, 2.7 or 3.2 billion people will suffer from drought, and temperatures will rise by more than 1.5 degrees Celsius annually, which will harm water quality, as confirmed by Steinkamp, K. (2017).

Secondly, the human factors negatively affecting water quality, such as the excessive demand for water, which leads to the flow of huge amounts of water to citizens, thus destroying areas of carbon that some plants require, such as peatlands, which require large amounts of water to grow and to use as biofuels, or what is known as biogas, which makes it a sustainable development project. Unfortunately, human actions prevent it from being applied. There is also an excessive amount of gray water which is not used and does not retain moisture in the soil. Consequently, modern irrigation (dripping) is not achieved, which wastes water.

Cutting mangrove trees, which are considered a natural dam against floods. One of the harms caused by humans is the dumping of factory waste and related chemicals in natural waters, which leads to malnutrition and destroys fish wealth for the population. Therefore, countries have turned to implementing sustainable development policies and putting the water issue within the scope of work because water is the structure of life on Earth.

Countries start with the Paris Agreement, as confirmed by the United Nations Committee on Climate Change. (L.T.). It is a global agreement that aimed for climate change during COP 21 in 2015. The agreement aims to reduce global warming, and in order for countries to reach this goal, emissions and green house gases must be reduced. The agreement is considered an official milestone in climate change, as each country presents its goals to contribute to the climate to achieve the goals of the agreement, while the contributing countries set long-term goals to reduce the world temperature and improve the climate.

On the financial side, the developed countries financially support water and climate change projects for developing countries. Therefore, climate finance is essential to reduce burdens and implement water-conserving technology. The veracity of the country's projects is verified through wireless communication with the team of members of the agreement to ensure safety on the projects and develop them on the ground.

Literature Review:

Firstly, the literature presents examples of climate change, and what are the sectors that have been affected, such as food and agriculture. As confirmed by the paper on climate change and conventional water. (2008). The paper is keen to preserve fresh water because water is responsible for world economic stability, human health, and all human activities. But the world states suffer from water pollution, so it has become one of the world's crises. Therefore, politicians must be alerted to conduct strategic studies towards water conservation and raise awareness among non-governmental organizations to preserve water resources. The adverse impacts of future climate change on freshwater systems are expected to outweigh the overall benefits (high confidence). By the 2050s, the amount of land affected by climate change is expected to be more than twice as much as it reduces water stress. In areas where water runoff is expected to decrease, the value of water resources will decrease significantly. Increased annual runoff is expected to increase the total water supply in the middle east. However, in the Arican regions, this gain is offset by the negative consequences of increased unpredictability of seasonal rainfalls, runoff changes in water availability and quality, and flood risk.

(Woodworth and Blackman, 2004) confirmed, In terms of sea levels. A sea level rise of ± 0.5 mm/year for the 20th century, 1.8 ± 0.5 mm/year for the period 1961-2003 and 3.1 ± 0.7 mm/year for the period 1993-2003. But it is still unknown whether this is due to the difference in weather over the ages and because of the disappearance of the ice surfaces in Antarctica. Sea level rise is likely to affect coastal areas, but attribution is not always clear. The extreme global sea level rise since 1975 is associated with average sea level rise and broad interannual climate variability. Therefore, if sea levels continue to rise, it will destroy green areas and crops, hindering the development of food. As a result, the water vapor deficit in the atmosphere grows, as does the evaporation rate. (Trenberth et al., 2003) confirms.

One of the effective natural factors is evaporation. Potential evaporation is expected to rise everywhere. This is because the ability of the atmosphere to hold water improves with increasing temperature. However, relative humidity is not expected to change significantly, especially in the oceans. This is because changes in precipitation and radiative forcing regulate changes in evaporation across the land, and these changes have an impact on the water balance. Flow, soil moisture and reservoir water.

(Gedney et al., 2006) confirms elevated levels of carbon dioxide gas increase evaporation rates because green plants need it to grow. Therefore, evaporation will increase, however, increased floods may require countries to build hundreds of dams and buildings to preserve fresh water, which requires much long-term financing.

(Miller et al., 1997). Prove that Water poverty may hinder sustainable development goals, such as the increase in pathogens. consequently, increasing water scarcity in those areas, as (Eakin and Lemos, 2006). Proves

The World Food and Agriculture Organization. (2003). Confirms that water plays a significant role in global food growth. Most countries in the Mediterranean basin will suffer from climate impacts on water, especially in the agricultural sector, including Europe and Asia. To clarify, “these continents depend on irrigated lands and represent about 18% of global agriculture,” so destroying those water areas will harm all living organisms. Therefore, too much water is not beneficial, and floods may destroy global food. Forests are considered sensitive and useful because they retain water, so temperatures must be reduced to prevent forest fires.

Secondly, human converters destroy fresh water due to the dumping of chemical factory materials and waste that spread diseases and reduce the rate of humanity, and thus human death rate

increases due to human actions. Drinking water must be preserved, prevented from being polluted, and provide clean water to poor places to reduce the death rate of human life.

Sowers, J. (2011) 'How has water been affected by climate change in the Middle East and Africa? As proven, the "poorest nations and populations" will suffer the brunt of the consequences of climate change. The negative impacts of global climate change reflect an unprecedented transfer of environmental suffering to vulnerable areas, including poor countries. Countries and communities that have had little to do with the long-term accumulation of greenhouse gas emissions into the atmosphere will face a greater burden of water-related climate change adaptation expenditures. Emerging countries as Egypt and South Africa are already dealing with serious structural economic issues, governance concerns, and environmental risks.

The Middle East and North Africa region is characterized by significant wealth disparities and unequal economies. One of the most notable areas was the disparity between which countries could afford to pay for new water sources or generate them and which faced significant financial challenges in doing so. Oil-producing countries such as Saudi Arabia, the Gulf city states, the UAE, and Libya exhausted their renewable freshwater resources decades ago and now rely on a combination of desalination, wastewater reuse, and drilling for fossil groundwater to meet growing demand. Likewise, Israel focuses on water desalination and wastewater reuse. All these countries use more water per capita than poor countries. Other countries in the region are divided into two groups:

Those with significant surface freshwater resources (such as Türkiye, Egypt, Sudan, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon) and other countries depend on groundwater, but are struggling to mobilize the kind of investments required to secure new widespread water supply. Countries (such as Morocco and Syria) depend on surface and groundwater resources.

Millions of people in the Middle East and North Africa region are already dealing with insufficient and polluted water sources. States have transferred responsibility for delivering water to households and individuals, especially in urban informal areas, where it is necessary to arrange private and expensive water supplies, while others suffer from water rationing, when water is provided for only a few hours a day, homes in Jordan and the West Bank, for example, have water storage tanks on top to store water for later use. Hence, deprived areas can also access water through illegal connections and direct use of irrigation or drainage canals.

Literary gap:

The literature review explained how countries have suffered from climate change due to natural factors such as floods, rising water levels, and the melting of glaciers due to rising

temperatures, thus destroying low-lying regions and food crops. Literature has explained how water has been polluted by human involvement in industry and the dumping of waste and chemicals into fresh water and drinking water that may harm human health and global food.

The gap is the decision of the countries of the world to build organizations to protect water and hold the annual climate conferences of parties to discuss new policies and projects that meet the sixth goal. Therefore, the third part will discuss the decisions and policies that countries discussed during the COP27 activities, especially the Water Day, to solve the water crisis in the future.

Methodology:

The methodology of the study paper includes a thorough examination of the impact of climate change on water resources, with a particular emphasis on the proceedings and conclusions of COP 27. The approach may be described as follows:

Literature Summary:

Through the assessment of the scholarly literature conducted, helped gather perspectives and conclusions on climate change and its implications on water supplies. This paper contributes to highlighting a vacuum in current research, namely the need for insights into nations' attempts to preserve water resources from climate change, natural catastrophes, and human activities. The study offers examples, such as Egypt's water management policies, to demonstrate how different nations are managing water concerns in the context of climate change. Analysis of choices and promises made during COP 27, notably on the Water Day, to better understand the steps taken to safeguard water resources.

Policy and Project Analysis:

Analysis of policies and initiatives addressed at COP 27, including the Water Damage and Loss Fund and the grey water utilization project. These initiatives will be critiqued and reviewed to assess their efficacy and areas for improvement. The research relies on official papers and publications from COP 27 and the UN. These publications provide information about emissions, climate adaptation plans, and financial assistance channels for water projects in underdeveloped nations.

Why This methodology:

The selected publications and studies provide a thorough overview of worldwide efforts to address water challenges connected to climate change, including policy choices influencing Egypt's

share of Nile River water. Moreover, provide sustainable and peaceful solutions against the Ethiopian renaissance dam crisis affecting Egypt's shares of water.

The literature includes perspectives from scholars and agencies, ensuring a comprehensive grasp of the issue. By conducting this methodology, the research paper aims to present a detailed and insightful analysis of how countries are addressing the water crisis in the context of climate change, particularly through the lens of COP 27's initiatives and outcomes.

Analyzing the policies taken in COP 27 for water protection:

The United Nations confirmed. (n.d) In contrast to COP 27, this conference followed the implementation of the procedures of the Paris Agreement and the Paris rule book, and it aims to reduce the temperature to 1.5 degrees annually to reduce emissions and protect water from deterioration. Accordingly, the Damage and Loss Fund was established to support developed countries and poor developing countries in the water affairs with a hundred billion dollars annually to support any project that protects water resources from pollution due to greenhouse gas emissions. Countries must find solutions to adapt to natural disasters that are harmful to water.

Damages and losses Fund:

Developing countries water affected by hurricanes and sea level rise must obtain support and then compensation from rich countries. Examples of countries that contributed to the damage and loss fund is Denmark, which paid thirteen million dollars to developing countries. The decision was made to force the harmful countries to pay the price for increasing emissions and to measure the percentage of countries' emissions in new ways, and the first evaluation will take place at the 28th Conference of Parties in 2023 to ensure the health and quality of the water.

Affirmed by COP 27. (2022). On seven elements of the water day. Firstly, the official launch of the Action for Water Adaptation and Resilience initiative (AWARE initiative¹).

¹ According to COP 27. (2022). & Sama, M. (2023). The AWARE Initiative aims to support inclusive cooperation to address water as a key component of climate change adaptation and resilience. It focuses on partnerships for early warning systems and early action related to water. The initiative seeks to offer transitional adaptation solutions for both the planet and people, starting with the world's most vulnerable communities and ecosystems. Initially, the focus is on the African region. Key aspects include information sharing, capacity development, water governance, joint investments in water observation, adaptive water management systems, and evaluation of optimal regional water adaptation options. It also evaluates national and regional water resources for food, energy, and water demand against future water scarcity. The initiative provides a neutral context for assessing green and grey water storage.

Vision (By 2030):

- Integrated water and climate action becomes standard practice in SDG-related efforts and within the context of the Paris Agreement.

The project, in collaboration with the World Meteorological Organization (WMO), for strengthening policy initiatives, practical actions, information exchange and field capacities to establish a pan-African water hub to place adaptive water management systems at the heart of the climate change adaptation agenda.

Secondly, attention and early adaptation are how countries prepare early for disasters or climate change to protect water, avoid water poverty, and rationalize rainwater consumption.

The third 'Earth Observation System for Monitoring and Management of River Basin Systems' is that given the inherent complexities of geospatial intelligence, the combination of rapidly increasing data sources and associated computational power is appropriately utilized so that the proposed Earth observation solution system is dynamic, scalable, operable and adaptable to allow for greater Of geospatial and temporal data and computational expansion domains. A case study illustrates monitoring of the Nile River Basin using a geospatial Earth observation-based support system. The possibility of monitoring any changes that may occur along the course of the Nile River.

Fourth, 'Water Security and Sustainable Development' discusses the existence of solutions to avoid water poverty in geographically sustainable ways such as water quality, evaporation, wastewater recycling, and digitalization of water management systems.

Fifth: Climate adaptation of the water sector in Africa is to simulate successful water systems and protect water from climate change. But these projects must be financially sustainable with the participation of private and public organizations.

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- All members have capabilities to assess their current water budget, future water demand/supply, and relevant forecasting and early warning capabilities.
 - This ensures food and energy security, flood and drought management, and addresses water impacts of climate change.

Mission:

- Support water policies.
- Provide means of implementation.
- Develop operational tools (e.g., early warning systems, monitoring platforms).
- Facilitate climate change cooperative and inclusive action.

Proposed Workstreams:

- Water resources policies
- Trusted monitoring systems
- Improved early warning systems.
- Optimal solutions integrating water and climate action.
- Green water and GHG accounting
- Cooperative analysis of river basin scale adaptation options
- Tools for equitable burden and benefit sharing.

Sixth: Effects of rising sea levels and solutions: Discussing projects to confront rising sea levels. But these projects need to pay attention to errors and conduct predictive studies on sea level rise to prevent the deterioration of fresh water, global food, or all human activities in need of fresh water.

Seventh ‘Contributions to a comprehensive UN mid-term review of the Decade of Action on Water’ and summarizing objectives ‘decisions’ policies and projects for water protection.

Grey water utilization project:

One of the best projects is to reuse gray water, which is bathing or sewage water, to prevent drought, as confirmed by a World Bank study. (2007) reported reducing the excessive use of water in agriculture and using gray water as a better alternative for freshwater conservation.

Conclusion:

The research paper explained how water became a global crisis and the damage caused by human and natural impacts such as sliding ice sheets and water pollution. The paper demonstrated how humanity affected water due to excessive use of energy that raises greenhouse gas emissions and sea levels. Therefore, the United Nations moved to initiate policies to protect international water and achieve sustainable development to reach the sixth goal of the seventeen goals of sustainable development. This was achieved through the establishment of organizations affiliated with the United Nations to protect water. The paper used the UN water organization as an example. The literature discussed how countries suffered from climate change in relation to their shares of water.

In terms of natural and human factors harmful to water, the literature has explained how the countries of the Middle East were affected by their water levels, and how their dependence on irrigated lands and rain was greatly affected, how the countries suffered from drought, and how families were affected by the lack of pure sanitation and the availability of drinking water.

The paper explained the gap in the literature, which is how countries addressed the water crisis and climate change through the global conferences of parties to find solutions to protect international water resources, and finally provided great sustainable solutions in COP 27, which established the Damage and Loss Fund to support the water rights of developing countries. The twenty seventh conference of the parties held the water day on the fourteenth of November, which discussed the seven elements of water conservation, the goals of the member countries in 2022 is to protect international water resources against climate change and measuring countries’ emissions for

the first time. The paper proposed a project to achieve the sixth goal and protect water, which is to exploit gray water in agriculture to prevent its waste.

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Cyberfeminism: Everyday Sexism, A Gardener's Tale Lens.

Reim Sabri Elsayed Ali

Section A: Introduction

“Grammar is politics by other means” This sentence by Donna Haraway is the essence of Cyber Feminism. It illustrates how the language used on the internet or cyberspace shows the hegemony of one sex over another. That is because the way people think of the world is influenced directly by the language they use to talk or write about it (Krist, 2017). In other words, how people perceive the world is shaped by the language used to perceive it. This applies to the language we use to talk or write and consequently, the language used in cyberspace. Since the beginning of the use of cyberspace, these notions of sexism have been evident. They already existed before. However, the internet highlighted it. Many feminist scholars tried to fight these notions of sexism online and offline. That is where Cyberfeminism as a term started to surface. Hence, Cyber Feminism is about using cyberspace to challenge these notions of sexism (Daniels, 2009).

This paper will conceptualize the meaning of Cyber Feminism and apply it to the case study of the “Everyday Sexism project”. Then it will use the Gardener's Tale allegory to explain sexism and how the Cyber feminism project “everyday sexism” addresses the issue. The research questions: to what extent does the Cyber feminism online movement “Everyday Sexism Project” help fight sexism according to the three levels of sexism in The Gardener's Tale? This study argues that there is an interplay of the three different dimensions of sexism. In addition, this same interplay should be addressed on all levels to generate an effective response to sexism. It also shows that the everyday sexism project only addresses two levels (the internalized and the personally mediated levels) of sexism. The paper will start with a conceptual framework for Cyberfeminism, the origins of the concept, and how it started. It will also explore its use worldwide in different contexts for Example: Cyberfeminism in the Arab World. Then, it will be followed by a thorough investigation of the allegory of Gardner's tale and how it explains racism. After that, the paper will explain and analyze the case study which is the “Everyday Sexism Project”. This part will also provide different storylines of women and girls and their experiences with sexism from the movement. Thereafter, there will be an analysis of the link between Gardner's Tale Allegory and sexism and the Cyberfeminism efforts of the movement and their results in combating this sexism.

Section B: Conceptual Framework

Since Cyberfeminism is a highly contested concept, this part of the paper will conceptualize it while highlighting the evolution of the concept. The first mention of this idea was by Donna Haraway in her essay “A Cyborg Manifesto” in 1985. Haraway was an American Biologist and Feminist (Ahmed, 2019). One needs to go back a little further to understand what Haraway meant by “cyborgs” and her argument. The concept of " cyborg “was first introduced by Manfred Clynes. He was a musician, scientist, and Innovator. The first mention of the word “cyborg” was in his article “Cyborgs and Space” in 1960 (Ahmed, 2019). In that article, he argued about altering the human body to make it suitable for space travel (Ahmed, 2019). However, Donna in her essay “A Cyborg Manifesto” argued the opposite. She said that humans are already cyborgs. Cyborg is a creature of both social reality and fiction.

Now how is that even possible? How can Humans be cyborgs? For Haraway, the cyborg is a metaphor for both our fragmented identities and our technological, bodily, and social reality in the late twentieth century (Barla, 2019). It is a way of thinking about the increasingly blurred boundaries between humans and technology. It is a being that challenges our traditional notions of what it means to be human. For instance: the smartphone in one’s pocket that connects them to a global network of information and communication, and the pacemaker that regulates someone’s heartbeat. They are all examples of how technology became an integral part of our lives blurring the lines between the organic and the artificial, the human and the machine and that is why she stated, “We are all cyborgs”. That is where Haraway’s vision becomes more profound. She challenges people not to see this hybridity as a threat to humanity but rather to embrace it. She saw it as an opportunity to redefine what it means to be human (Barla, 2017).

The Cyborg for Haraway may be a symbol of liberation, it is a rejection of the rigid categories and binaries that have traditionally defined people’s understanding of gender identity and power. For example: the binary oppositions that have been used to justify inequality and oppression throughout history like male/female, nature/culture, civilized/primitive, and self/other. the cyborg is supposed to disrupt these binaries. This shows that reality is more fluid and complex than one can often acknowledge. Haraway (1985), believed that the internet has changed the human conscience. Hence, virtual reality no longer only surrounds people but exists within them. That is why she believed that cybernetics may help in making a world that can challenge gender differences and stereotypes (Haraway, 1985). She envisioned a world that Transcends gender disparities, and sexual differences, and challenges the patriarchal notions of society (Haraway, 1985). In other words, a more neutral world.

Thus, her manifesto and her ideas influenced other scholars to build on them. The term “Cyberfeminism” itself was coined by Sadie Plant in 1994. She was the Cybernetics Culture research unit director at the University of Warwick in Britain (Consalvo, 2012). She used it to describe the Feminist work that was interested in critiquing, theorizing, and utilizing the internet, cyberspace, and new media technologies (Consalvo, 2012). In addition, it tends to focus more on younger generations. However, the body of cyberfeminists is growing opening doors for divergent ideas about what cyberfeminism means as a thought and as an action (Consalvo, 2012). For instance, according to Gajjala and Mamidipudi (1999), cyberfeminism is feminism in relation to cyberspace. It is the implications of the use of internet technology and its benefits to women. It argues that women should not only be able to access the internet but also define the shape and content of cyberspace. Moreover, cyberfeminism cannot be described as a unified feminist group with a concrete theoretical and political agenda (Melford, 2015). That’s why many cyberfeminists refuse to identify cyberfeminism altogether. According to Flanagan and Booth, the term refers to a “sporadic, tactical, and contradictory set of theories and practices.” (Melford, 2015). One other definition of it is an alliance of women and machines (Wilding, 1998).

However, Cyberfeminism was not only evident in the Western world. It was also present in other parts of the world like the Arab World. Many scholars connect Cyberfeminism in the Arab world with the Arab Spring. Although it did play a vital role, Arab women’s use of cyberspace and social media outlets as a means of activism and cyberfeminism far predates the Arab Spring. According to Stephan (2013), Since 1999, they have found it useful to further their activity and design their own forms of feminism. They conducted and published studies on socioeconomic and gender inequality, mobilized the grassroots movement to improve women's conditions, and increased public awareness of women's issues through the Internet. The Arab Women's Solidarity Association International United (AWSA-United) was the first Arab women's advocacy group to take action online. The goal of the AWSA, which was established in Egypt in 1982 under the direction of Dr. Nawal Al-Saadawi, was to establish a connection between the liberation of Arab women and the Arabs' fight for independence from domination in the media, economy, and culture. Further chapters were founded around the US in the years that followed its creation. Although, they separated themselves after that from the Original one (Stephan, 2013).

Nevertheless, the outburst of the Arab Spring drew greater attention to women’s cyber activism in countries like Tunisia and Egypt where women turned to the Internet as a means of protest. Women used social media platforms like Facebook and Twitter, blogs, YouTube, and picture-uploading websites to their advantage to question societal norms, raise awareness of issues, and connect the

fight for women's equality and rights to the effort of rebuilding their own countries. For instance: in 2011, Lina Ben Mhenni, a Tunisian girl, blogged, tweeted, and reported on Mohamed Bouazizi's self-immolation and the turmoil that followed.

This activism continued even after the Arab Spring until today. for instance: the case of the so-called honor killing of a 30-year-old Jordanian woman at the hands of her father. Reports say that he was running behind her with a brick and bludgeoned her to death, before sitting down, lighting a cigarette, and drinking a cup of tea (Imran, 2020). Another case was the case of Israa Abu-Ghraib. She was a Palestinian girl whose male relatives also murdered her because she was spotted in a public café with her fiancé. These two cases caused outrage on social media platforms. This online outrage sparked larger campaigns and marches in many cities like Jerusalem, Gaza, Haifa, Beirut, and Berlin (Al Atiyat, 2020).

Hence, cyberfeminism has different definitions. It is not a single theory or ideology. However, the most basic thing that defines cyberfeminism that most agree on is utilizing cyberspace to create a more neutral environment among genders.

Section C: Theoretical Framework

This part will explain the theoretical framework. It is The Gardener's Tale by Camara Jones. Although this allegory was used in the first place to illustrate racism and levels of racism. This paper will use it to explain sexism and gender stereotypes. Hence, what is Gardener's tale? There is a Gardner who has two boxes of flowers. One box has fertile and rich soil, while the other has rocky and poor soil. This gardener has two packets of seeds of the same kind. However, the plants grown from both are different in color. One grows pink blossoms and the other red. The gardener prefers red over pink. That's why he plants the red-colored seeds in the fertile rich box and the pink-colored seeds in the rocky poor box.

Consequently, all the red flowers bloom and grow, the strongest ones becoming tall and robust while even the smallest ones reach a medium height. Things appear different in the box with the rocky soil, though. The weakest pink seeds do not even survive, and the strongest ones barely reach a medium height (Jones, 2000).

Over time, these flowers drop their progeny in the same soil, and the process repeats itself. Hence, when a survey is done a couple of years later by Gardner, he observes both flowers and concludes that he was right in preferring red over pink flowers (Jones, 2000). Hence, what are the three levels of racism in this allegory? They are the institutionalized level that was evident in the separation of

the seeds in two different types of soil. The second level is the personally mediated level of racism. It is when the gardener disfavors the pink blossoms because they look miserable. Then, he plucks it before it even can grow. Or for instance, when a seed from the pink flower has been blown into the rich soil, he plucks it before it can grow. Then, the third level is internalized racism. This is when a bee pollinates the pink flowers, and the pink flowers refuse because they internally feel inferior to the red. That is because they look at the red flowers in their boxes seeing them flourish. This makes pink feel inferior to red (Jones, 2000). Therefore, this allegory could be applied in the case of sexism, too.

Section D: Case Study: Everyday Sexism Project

This part of the paper will explain a case study on Cyberfeminism, a hashtag called “everyday sexism”. The ubiquity of sexism is increasing in everyday life. This sparked the interest of some scholars in the relationship between technology and sexism. As there is sexism women face offline and online, there are also women fighting it offline and online (Melville, 2018). One of the online projects designed to fight sexism is the Everyday Sexism Project. This project was founded by Laura Bates in 2012. She even wrote a book about it and called it “everyday sexism” in 2014. It has received more than 100,000 submissions in 13 languages since its beginning (Melville, 2018). People upload their submissions and stories on the project’s Twitter account or hashtag directly or through the site “everydaysexism.com”. Laura began this project in response to the common narrative that sexism no longer exists in contemporary life and that women already have the same rights as men (McGuire, 2014). She began this hashtag to share the stories of different women with sexism, gender stereotyping, and fighting the gender roles in society.

Stories on women on the site can either be with names or anonymous. This site has thousands of stories since its creation up until now. After a thorough study of over 500 stories on this site, most of these stories were stories of women being assaulted, harassed, or raped, by boyfriends and romantic partners, family members, colleagues, bosses, teachers, and even random people in the streets. For example, Lauren who was raped by a classmate in medical school, and Pauline who was raped by her boyfriend. That is a sample of many similar stories. Different names yet the same pattern. A huge part of these stories was also about women in the workplace. Many stories range from women not being taken seriously in the workplace to sexist comments and inappropriate actions from colleagues and managers. So many stories of verbal and physical assaults. In addition, a major problem that was discussed in these stories was the household sexism. The different treatment girls receive while growing up. A plethora of girls shared their experiences of being treated as second-class citizens in

their households by family members, especially their parents. For instance, a 15-year-old girl whose father was angry at her for not learning how to cook.

This project is one example of the Cyber feminism movement that started to arise in the digital age. It fits into the definition of Cyberfeminism. As mentioned before, Cyber Feminism is about using cyberspace to empower women, fight patriarchal systems, gender roles, and gender stereotypes, and fight sexism in all aspects of life (Daniels, 2009). It is online Feminism. The project is about making women share their stories to raise awareness and fight these sexist norms in society. The movement utilized social media networks to serve its case.

Section E: Analysis: A Gardener's Tale Lens.

After illustrating the case study everyday sexism project as a cyberfeminism example. This part will analyze sexism through the gardener's tale and how this project tried to combat it. One must know how sexism originated to know how to address it. The Gardener's Tale provides an understanding of sexism and its levels that should be addressed to challenge it. The gardener has two boxes of soil fertile and rocky. He also has two packets of the same type of seeds. However, one of them turns pink and the other one turns red. The gardener favors the red blossoms over the pink. Here the two packets of seeds represent men (the red blossoms or the favored ones) and women (the pink blossoms or the less favored ones). Since the gardener already prefers red (men), He puts him in the strong soil to grow and prosper, while putting women in the poor soil.

After a while, red (men) prospers and flourishes while pink (women) are scrawny and pitiful. Then, the gardener assumes that he was right in favoring men over women because they are stronger and more flourishing. This allegory shows how sexism is generated. It is generated on three levels. The institutional level is in separating the two soils and the initial preference for red over pink. It is about how laws and rules are different for men and women. For example, payment for the same job, adultery laws (Gameel, 2020), and Polygamy. For instance: adultery laws in Egypt are different for men and women. A man is only considered to have committed adultery if he has sex with another woman within the home he shares with his wife. If he has sex with an unmarried woman outside of the marital home, he is not legally considered to have committed adultery. On the other hand, women were considered to have committed adultery whether in or outside the marital home. Not to mention that the punishment itself is different. A wife who is shown to have committed adultery must serve two years in prison, while an adulterous husband, however, receives only six months (Gameel, 2020). The second is the personally mediated level. This one is obvious in disfavoring and plucking pink blossoms because they are weak. In addition, plucking them from the red-rich soil if they got there.

This represents how when women try to do what men do, act in the same way, or have similar jobs, they are stopped from doing that. This is based on the presumption that they are not able to do a man's job. The third level is the internalized one. The personally mediated level is about how women are perceived. On the other hand, the internalized one is about how they perceive themselves. When they see that men are strong and flourishing, they will believe that they are inferior to them.

Hence, after examining how can the gardener's tale explain sexism. Then how should sexism be addressed? Since sexism has three levels, then it must be addressed on the three levels and not just one of them. Fighting sexism should include each one of these levels. That's because the levels are intertwined and affect each other. Thus, this is how to explain sexism through the gardener's tale. Then what is the relation with the Cyber Feminist project everyday sexism? This project is one of the efforts by cyber feminists to fight sexism in everyday life. It delivers the voices of many women and makes their experiences heard. This in turn raises awareness about sexism and tries to change how society perceives women. It also changes how women see themselves. This online hashtag spread widely and rapidly which makes it very effective. However, it lacks implementation because it does not tackle the institutional level of sexism. Although it provided a safe spot for women to share their daily experiences with sexism, it was merely a record of all these women's stories. It did not have a tangible effect on the laws and actions already happening.

Section F: Conclusion

In a nutshell, this paper talks about Cyber Feminism and its different definitions. It conceptualized the concept using a case study called the everyday sexism hashtag. The paper asked the question: to what extent did the everyday sexism cyber feminism project help fight sexism using the gardener's tale as a criterion? The paper showed that everyday sexism made a lot of effort to challenge sexism on the personally mediated and internalized levels of the gardener's tale. However, it lacks a legal framework that could make it address the institutional level. It did help women speak up about their stories. It did also affect how these women see themselves and helped them recognize sexism when it happens to them. However, it did not change the fact that it happened or still happening to them.

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Institutionalizing Climate Finance: Addressing Challenges in Small Island Developing States

Habiba Amr and Alaa Ahmed

I. Introduction

The sustainable development goals and the Paris agreement all agree that it is impossible to achieve economic prosperity without tackling the issue of climate change. The growing risks associated with rising sea levels, and the increasing frequency of extreme weather events highlight the urgency in addressing climate change. The urgency of climate action has never been more evident nowadays. As the world gradually starts to recover from economic and geopolitical shocks such as COVID-19 and the Russian-Ukrainian war and their economic, social, and political repercussions, the challenges that SIDS are compounding. These challenges range from limited fiscal space, non-diversified economic activity, extreme vulnerability to climate change due to their location and their low credit ratings.

Small Island Developing States (SIDS) consist of a group of countries and territories allocated in the Caribbean, Pacific, Africa region, Indian Ocean, and South China Sea (Robinson, 2017). Even though small islands are considered to be the least accountable for climate change, all SIDS are vulnerable to it, through the effects of sea-level rise and more intense tropical and extratropical storms (Mycoo et al., 2022). Additionally, they have very significant adaptation costs due to their high vulnerability and susceptibility to climate change (Robinson & Dornan, 2017).

SIDS have weak governance frameworks and institutions that are unsuitable for dealing with the multifaceted nature and unpredictability of climate change. Hence, the global community has been asked to help them create and carry out actions to tackle the economic, social, and environmental effects of climate change and sea-level rise (United Nations, 1992, p. 194). Additionally, The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) highlighted the necessity for capacity development assistance especially for adapting to climate change. The activities of SIDS that are related to climate imply the ability to meet their Nationally Determined Contributions and Sustainable Development Goals by 2030 in the long run. Hence, it is crucial for SIDS to facilitate the pace, and scope, of the change required to address the climate problem. This is dependent not just on the monetary resources that they can mobilise, but also to a significant degree upon the capacity of individuals, groups, and the larger, systemic capacity to facilitate such a transformation (Rasheed, 2021).

This paper aims to analyse the challenges faced by SIDS in accessing climate finance through an institutionalist perspective by examining the funding level, the sectoral allocation, and the approach

by which the SIDS access to funds. Additionally, addressing the challenges and opportunities in accessing climate in finance in SIDS. The paper is divided as follows: section II reviews the existing literature, section III analyses the collected data using descriptive analysis, section IV concludes, and section V provides policy recommendations.

II. Literature review

The importance of international public financing in climate change mitigation is growing rapidly. Wealthy nations' annual pledge of \$100 billion to fund climate action for the least developed nations was critical to obtaining widespread support for the 2015 Paris Agreement (UNFCCC, 2015). The increasing accessibility of climate finance is critical to maintaining confidence in the Agreement, and several vulnerable countries currently depend on it to fund a variety of climate projects (Ciplet et al., 2015).

Even though it is noticeable that wealthy countries have not yet reached their commitments, climate finance is expanding quickly in scope and effect (Carty, Kowalzig, & Zagma, 2020). Since international financing for climate change increases, it encounters a governance challenge. In recent years, multilateral organizations entrusted with monitoring have faced increasing pressure to avoid corruption and financial mismanagement of international resources and to ensure that funds are dispersed with equity and efficiency (Khan et al., 2019). The response to these difficulties seems to be considered a continuation of policies developed over the years of international public finance, including measures promoting "good governance" and "institution building."

II.I Theoretical review

Institutionalism Theory and climate finance

Institutionalism theory within climate finance implies that the institutional structures and processes that control the distribution and management of funding for climate-related projects have a significant impact on the efficacy and success of such initiatives. This theory emphasizes the importance of understanding how institutions, organizations, policies, as well as governance frameworks affect the result of climate financing activities. In this context, institutions are defined as systems of norms, procedures, or practices that control behaviors, restrict activity, and form expectations, not only distinct organizations like government entities (Keohane, 1988).

Additionally, Institutions serve as sources of power that shape relationships among individuals, corporations, civil society groups, governments, and other entities across time. National governing organizations and entities, the rules and processes that regulate their interactions with one another, and the laws and regulations they make (Patterson, J., 2021). Additionally, Institutions play a crucial

part in climate change adaptation (CCA), and institutional weaknesses have been recognized as a barrier to adaptation (Biesbroek, alt, 2013) contends that, due to the complexities aspect of climate change adaptation, an institutional approach is required; either institutional change or raised institutional capacity is needed to tackle the issue, and adaptation mainstreaming is impossible with no institutional change.

Moreover, according to Rodrik (2000) and Sen (1999), institutional change must be based on decision-making at the local level and restoring the opportunity for recipient nations to engage with endogenous institutions would make it possible for these institutions to reset the context uniqueness and legitimacy (Dunning, Pop-Eleches, 2004). The most important aspect of the countries is how institutions operate: "who they help, who they hurt, and how much" (Brinkerhoff & Goldsmith, 2005).

Adapting to Climate Change and Institutional Changes can serve as several bodies or laws and norms or serve as a dynamic process of "shared practices" and interactions (Bisaro, 2018). According to Cuevas the three main explanations for institutional change: (i) raising societal changes and growing awareness of climate change as an essential societal issue; (ii) the need for resilient climate change leadership to face future challenges; and (iii) establishing a cross-sectoral strategy in the long run rather than a siloed short-term vision, (2018).

Institutional Capacity Theory

The IPCC Assessment reports define adaptive capacity as "the ability of systems as a whole, institution, humans and other entities to adjust to potential damage, get advantage of opportunities, or react to consequences. "Adaptive capacity is further described as "the ability of a system to modify its characteristics or practices, to expand its adapting ability under prevailing climate variability, or future climate conditions" (Smit & Wandel, 2006).

The theory of institutional capacity gives some insight into the larger notion of capacity. Institutional capacity theory refers to the "enabling environment" that supports interactions between people and organizations. Long-term success in educating individuals and building organizations requires alignment with existing institutions or transformation to ensure activities are based on their values. How people and organizations interact in the public sector and society could be more important to the whole level of capacity. This ought to be particularly applicable to climate policies. Since a cross-cutting issue, it necessitates collaboration between a wide range of people and organizations. Capacity is also necessary at all stages of the policymaking process, such as a robust monitoring, reporting, and evaluation system to improve the long-term efficacy of the climate policy and particular policies and actions.

Thus, Institutional theory in climate finance highlights the importance of a comprehensive

approach to setting up and carrying out climate finance projects that consider the institutional aspects that determine their performance. Understanding and resolving institutional challenges can help to improve climate finance's influence on climate change mitigation and sustainable development.

Capacity-building initiatives are more efficient if they encourage integrated and comprehensive approaches to challenges with multiple objectives (Ratter, Petzold, & Sinane, 2016). Tackling the reasons that make SIDS vulnerable should be for the Donors' rule (Westoby, Clissold, and McNamara, 2021). This entails incorporating climate considerations into all new development initiatives to tackle the main causes of climate vulnerability as well as alter policies where necessary.

Assessing Climate Finance's Influence

Assessing climate finance's influence on adaptation and capacity, especially at the level of institutions, remains challenging despite significant investments (Khan & Roberts, 2013). Two essential elements to obtain effective national policies have been recognized: environmental and climate policy integration, which involves cross-sectoral ministries recognizing the urgency of climate change adaptation and considering its effects on national policies (Runhaar et al., 2017), and adaptive capacity of institutions, which enables the country's adaptive capacity. Countries' institutional structures may lack these two characteristics, as ministries typically function in silos with conflicting aims (Runhaar et al., 2014).

Building institutional capacity at the national level is crucial for implementing effective climate change adaptation measures. Capacity-building initiatives, such as the Green Climate Fund Readiness Preparatory Promote Programme (RPSPs or Readiness Grants), promote this goal. Few research have explored the relationship between climate funding, adaptation mainstreaming, and adaptable institutional capability.

II.II Empirical evidence

Obtaining long-term funding can help enhance national capacity towards climate resilience by gradually incorporating climate challenges within domestic policy and financing. This improves capability in key areas such as financial management, procurement, and safeguarding (Thomas et al., 2020[177]), necessitating further attention. In SIDS, just 28% of public money is disbursed using country financial management systems (GPEDC, 2019[171]). Donors are increasingly adopting more integrated methods.

Donor's assistance to Kiribati's governance and institutional capacities, including a national ministry to obtain long-term strategy and financing, supported the Kiribati Adaptation Program. The program aimed at decreasing vulnerability to climate change, variability, and sea-level rise through increasing awareness, securing water resources, and controlling inundation (World Bank,

2017 [26]).

Rwanda has made significant advances in strengthening its institutional capacity for financing climate change, which is demonstrated by the successful mobilization of more than \$200 million in climate finance for diverse adaptation and mitigation initiatives. According to the World Bank (2019), Rwanda has achieved significant institutional reforms to expedite the process of getting climate funding, which has helped to accomplish this goal. These changes include the creation of specific divisions and departments, which include the Climate Change Division under the Ministry of Economic Growth and Job Creation, that has helped to coordinate climate financing programs and promote climate-resilient development. Rwanda has also actively participated in capacity-building programs, such as the Capacity Building Initiative for Transparency (CBIT), to improve its experts' abilities in reporting on climate actions and progress (Dubai, 2023).

The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) reports that Haiti's inadequate institutional capability and governance difficulties have hindered climate financing mobilization. The UNDP's evaluation emphasizes the necessity of institutional adaptation ability in obtaining climate funds and carrying out successful climate action programs. The discrepancy between Rwanda and Haiti highlights the importance of institutional changes and capacity building for improving access to climate funding and promoting climate-resilient progress in vulnerable countries.


III. Data Analysis and Methodology

The methodology employed in this paper is descriptive analysis of the disparities in climate finance within the SIDS as well as the disparities in the sectoral allocations. This section aims to provide valuable findings that are essential to understand the dynamics of climate finance in Small Island Developing States (SIDS). This section dives into 2 main aspects of climate finance within SIDS. First, the paper looks into the flow of climate finance in SIDS, examining funding levels, sectoral allocation, and regional disparities among regions within SIDS.

This section aims to provide valuable findings that are essential to understand the dynamics of climate finance in Small Island Developing States (SIDS).

III.I International Climate Finance Flows to SIDS


Figure 1



Source:OECD

Although the promise of the \$100 billion dollar made at COP15 in Copenhagen is not reached yet, the data show an upward trend in the climate finance mobilized towards SIDS. However, the level of finance declined in 2019 which needs to be examined by donors to fulfill their commitments to SIDS. The statistics show that SIDS have received only \$1.5 billion which do not commensurate SIDS as in the nationally determined contributions (NDCs) which are \$92 dollars (OECD).

Figure 2




Source: OECD

Another issue that needs to be addressed is the disparities in funding distributions among

different sectors. As shown in the figure above almost 70% of climate finance was allocated in mitigation projects such as renewable energy and energy initiatives while less than 30% was allocated towards adaptation. Although the energy transition is one of the SIDS top priorities, their location makes them more vulnerable which makes them in need of more financing for adaptation. SIDS are more vulnerable to natural disasters, sea level rise ocean acidification and increased storm activity (CCAC secretariat, 2023). SIDS climate vulnerability stems from their geographic location, exposure to sea-level rise, increased storm activity and their reliance on imports for both fuel and food, which makes them vulnerable to price volatility and global food shortages. Therefore, SIDS require more funding for adaptation to increase their resilience to the frequent climate-related disasters. SIDS suffer almost five times more climate-related deaths and on average 0.8% of SIDS collective Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is lost due to extreme weather events. Collectively SIDS are projected to face a loss and damage, caused by climate change, of \$56 billion by 2050 (Panwar et al., 2023).

Figure 3



Source: ODI

There are significant regional disparities among regions in SIDS. As shown in the Figure above the Pacific region has the largest amount of approved funds (\$1 billion almost 44% of the total approved funding for projects in the region), followed by the Caribbean which has funds approval of \$822 million (37%) while the Association of Island States - Small Island Developing States only receive around \$439 million (19%) of approved funds in projects.

These regional disparities in the allocation of climate finance, present a significant challenge for SIDS since they can intensify the existing vulnerabilities and undermine SIDS' efforts in addressing climate-related issues. In addition to that these regional disparities could lead to

underfunding of highly vulnerable regions, limiting their capacity to adapt to climate change.

III.II Challenges in Climate Finance Mechanisms

The main challenge that SIDS face in accessing climate finance is the climate finance ecosystem. The current climate finance ecosystem still works on a one-size-fits all model that fail to take in the economic and geographic conditions of SIDS. While the past developmental projects and dividing economics development in key sectors allowed SIDS to maintain a middle-income status, SIDS remain extremely vulnerable you any external shocks.(Bishop, 2021, pg. 1.) Despite their well-known vulnerabilities SIDS still face eligibility issues when applying for concessional finance and Official Development Aid (ODA) (UN- OHRLLS, 2020). These challenges remain evident even after OECD decision to align ODA and multilateral development bank (MBD) to the Paris agreement. These decisions did not include more flexibility of SIDS eligibility given their unique vulnerabilities to climatechange.

It was reported that in 2017 only half of the climate finance received by SIDS was non-concessional and almost 50% of it was coming from non-grant mechanisms, this leaves SIDS with limited fiscal space and makes their economy more vulnerable to external shocks such as the COVID-19 pandemic. As the debt burdens are further exacerbated by external shocks there is no way to cope with the intensifying impacts of climate change. Some SIDS were even forced to redirect budgets dedicated to sustainable development to pay their debts (Thomas, and Theokritoff, 2021 and UN-OHRLLS,2020). Concessional Finance remains the primary financing that flows into SIDS after which prevails the inadequacy of the system Since it shows that climate finance institutions are adopting a reactive approach rather than a proactive approach. The inadequacy of the climate finance system is also evident in the reliance of a country's per capita income to determine a nations' needs and capacity to respond to a natural disaster (Blampied,2017). While income per capita may be a good indicator, it overlooks the challenges faced by SIDS due to their unique geographical location and economic circumstances. The disparities that SIDS face in accessing climate finance highlights the importance of institutions in creating effective policies and resource allocation. Therefore, we recommend an institutional reform in the governing bodies of climate finance to effectively address the inequalities that these regions face.

IV. Conclusion

In conclusion, through the examination of Small Islands Developing States through the lens of institutionalism, challenges and opportunities were found. While strong institutions are crucial

for finance management and effective policies, inequalities still persist in SIDS. In spite of the increase in financing levels to SIDS they still fall short to meet the required amount to fulfil SIDS ambitious Nationally determined contributions (NDCs), which leaves them extremely vulnerable to climate change and any external shocks.

In addition to that the climate finance system still works in a one-size-fits-all approach and fails to consider SIDS Vulnerabilities. Eligibility criteria always creates a barrier for SIDS which limits their access to climate finance. The challenges that SIDS face in accessing climate finance shows the systemic flaws in the global financial architecture that fails to take into consideration SIDS economic and geographical situation making it non-inclusive.

This calls for urgent systemic reforms to address the underlying challenges and issues faced by SIDS comprehensively, rather than relying on temporary solutions triggered by climate-related disasters.

V. Policy Recommendations

The global challenge of climate change requires effective and coordinated response. In recognition of the existing gaps in the climate financial landscape and the imperative to mobilize funds for vulnerable communities this policy proposal outlines strategies to strengthen the global climate finance and enhance resilience at all levels. The policy recommendations put forward provide a holistic approach to address challenges faced by SIDS.

Firstly, international financial institutions and climate finance institutions should enhance climate finance access, this includes more flexible funding mechanisms given SIDS Vulnerabilities and streamlining application processes to decrease bureaucratic obstacles and provide targeted funding for developmental projects to increase resilience.

Secondly, enhancing data collection and knowledge sharing among SIDS. Sharing experience and knowledge among countries with the similar economic, geographic, and political conditions would help SIDS to access more climate finance and enhance adaptation efforts.

Creating a knowledge-sharing network for best practices, adaptation strategies and lessons learned for financing mechanisms and partnerships will facilitate such exchanges. Data collection and risk assessment systems tailored to adaptation needs of SIDS need to be established to secure climate finance. It is important to recognize that proper data collection is needed to determine the type of projects needed in SIDS and the funding needed for them.

Strengthening data collection on SIDS involves clear objective definition and standardized methods. Additionally, regular monitoring and quality control ensures reliable and accurate

data. Moreover, data collection methods should be enhanced by employing data analysis skills and technology. Long term commitment to transparency and consistent efforts contributes to effective adaptation progress.

Lastly, we suggest incorporating the loss and damage fund in the global financial architecture. With the recent achievement in COP28 and the pledges of money to the fund, we recommend that the loss and damage fund acts as an emergency fund. This fund does not only serve as an immediate relief to climate-related disasters but also addresses the historical debt owned by developed nations. By compensating SIDS for loss and damage this fund offers a lifeline in times of crises, helping these nations recover and become more resilient to impacts of climate change.

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Politicisation of intersectional feminism as a fundamental solution to the politicisation of migration: The case of Türkiye between 2015 and 2019

Rola Elzeini

1. Introduction

Identity politics refers to “politics which groups of people having a particular racial, religious, ethnic, social, or cultural identity tend to promote their own specific interests or concerns without regard to the interests of any larger political group” (Merriam-Webster, n.d.). There are two major methods of categorising identity politics: Common humanity and common enemy. Whereas the former is based on solidarity built on common interests and purpose, the latter’s solidarity is built on excluding a particular enemy. Following the same line of reasoning, nationalist identity politics could follow either of the two aforementioned forms. With the surge of migration, several states with strong national identities witnessed waves of xenophobia towards immigrants.

Since such actions are performed against people with fragile rights with limited regulations and protection and political attempts to lessen the harsh environment of immigrants are exclusive to social services, this paper aims to identify the extent to which nationalist identity politics exacerbates xenophobia.

This paper attempts to unravel the answer to the question of: To what extent does strong nationalist identity politics aggravates anti-immigration sentiments? The paper proposes two arguments. First, strong national identity sentiments are prone to view immigrants as the common enemy, leading to exclusion and oppression of such group. Second, intersectional feminist thought strengthens the inclusivity of migrants in a receiving state and lessens the sturdiness of nationalist identity politics within a society. It, in turn, acts as a buffer zone protecting migrant women against violent waves of nationalist beliefs. The paper proposes that when feminist identity transcends nationalistic stands of people, the gendered impacts of migration are, to some extent, diluted.

The research employs a case-study qualitative research, as well as quantitative research based on content analysis from Platform X to convey a rough picture of Turkish nationalism and perceptions about Syrian refugees in Türkiye in the period between 2015 and 2019. This specific timeframe is chosen with the purpose of shedding the light on the surge of exclusion during a time

in which the level of migration surged in Türkiye leading to exacerbating the waves of hate against refugees. Syrian refugees are chosen due to the following reasons: first, the language difference acts as a barrier that further exacerbates their exclusion; second, their ethnic, Arab, identity that is different from the Turkish ethnicity renders them vulnerable to being labelled as the unfit other, or the corrupt other; and third, the influx of Syrian refugees to Türkiye has been paramount and increasing rapidly, which allows for sufficient and correct assessment of the issues facing them in Türkiye. Additionally, X Platform was specifically chosen, due to its lack of comprehensive censorship which allows for unfiltered collection of the public's opinions (Matamoros-Fernández & Farkas, 2021).

This research is divided into three sections. The first part provides a conceptual framework of the employed terms, and their interconnectedness is mapped out. An application of the conceptual framework is, then, carried out on the case of Türkiye to assess anti-immigration sentiments and its gendered impacts on Syrian refugees in Türkiye. Lastly, the reasoning why the voice of intersectional feminism in social media platforms is essential to combatting anti-immigration sentiments is elaborated.

2. Conceptual Framework

This paper highlights the significance of three crucial terms to the research and its findings. The Terms are: Anti-immigration; national identity; and intersectional feminism. Anti-immigration refers to actions or sentiments that are “characterized by or expressing opposition to or hostility toward immigrants” (Merriam-Webster, n.d.).


The second term to be employed is national identity which is defined in this paper in reference to Walker Connor's definition. It is a form of political identity that reflects the psychological bond tying the individuals of a particular land through language, ethnicity, or customs and which possess a distinctive political community (Dahbour, 2002, p. 20). In that sense, national identity is built on a sense of sharing exclusive identity within a specific group.

In 1989, Kimberlé Crenshaw coined the term intersectional feminism in reference to “a prism for seeing the way in which various forms of inequality often operate together and exacerbate each other” (as cited in UN Women, 2020). Intersectional feminism attempts to identify

the different layers of oppression and inequalities which different groups face in different circumstances.

Crenshaw (1991) highlighted the essential role of intersectional feminism in intermediating rigid identity politics, on the one hand, and the politicisation of particular groups of societies (p. 1296). On applying the term in cases of anti-migration sentiments, one would be able to move away from the stereotypical lens of looking at issues facing migrants as purely security issues, such as food, health, and accommodation rights, to dissecting the societal issues facing refugees in the receiving states, including exclusion in society and work and multilayered oppression.

Figure 1



The three terms provide a fundamental base for this research's analysis. As displayed in figure 1, the relational equation between anti-immigration and national identity is cyclical. In other words, anti-immigration discourse strengthens national identity by means of solidarity among the native citizens against the other. Such causation leads to the insurgence of intolerance towards immigrants. At the same time, strong national identity sentiments within a state's nationals leads to innate rejection of the other.

On the other side of the equation, intersectional feminism acts as an intervening variable impacting both anti-immigration and national identity. Feminism, in its essence, contradicts with the principle of national identity, for it perceives nationalism as a replica of patriarchy (Al-Ali & Tas, 2018, pp. 543-454).² This is mainly because feminism believes that identity and equality do

² Not all feminist streams believe in the obstruct nature of nationalism. Feminism in the Global South, for instance, was utilised as a means for independence and strengthening the national identity (Al-Ali & Tas, 2018, p. 453). Yet,

not co-exist, one or the other has to overpower (Steinem, 2016). In addition, feminism transcends political identities, while national identity is deeply embedded in the concept of political identities.

More specifically, intersectional feminism deals with the different oppressive layers women face in different circumstances while acknowledging that national identities perpetuate inequalities (Bastia, 2014). Intersectional feminism strengthens the call for inclusive and gender sensitive integration policies for migrants, as well as societal tolerance. As such, intersectional feminism hinders the cause and impact of the issue. Thus, this paper proposes embedding intersectional feminist thought in media speeches as an antidote to anti-immigration sentiments.

To be able to explain the power of intersectional feminism in combatting anti-immigration sentiments, there must be a rough description of the anti-immigration sentiments in Türkiye. Thus, the following section provides an explanatory landscape for the anti-immigrant stands of Turkish nationals.

3. Anti-Refugee Sentiments in Türkiye

The critical conundrum facing migrants in hosting states is the securitisation of migration. Post the European refugee crisis of 2015, several European states framed migration as a security issue that threatens their nation states (Fotou, 2021). Politicians and the media equally framed migrants as intruders that risk the cohesion of the society (Fotou, 2021). This issue was not exclusivist of Türkiye in which millions of Syrian sought refuge (Bandur, 2020, p. 69).

While the Turkish government, attempted to formulate and adopt tolerant policies towards Syrian refugees and asylum seekers (European Council on Refugees and Exiles, 2023), the society was not as tolerant, nor were the opposing parties. Turkish society viewed Syrians as intruders who do not fit in their European akin society (Bandur, 2020, pp. 69-70). Turks perceived Arab Syrian as unequal individuals who cannot be integrated into the society. The result was that Syrian refugees suffered from exclusion, hate waves, violence, and exploitation (Bandur, 2020).

Feminism, in general, does not stand by ethnocentric nationalism, for its exclusivist and hierarchical nature (Al-Ali & Tas, 2018, p. 454).

Content analysis was carried out on platform X whereby the words “Syrian refugees” and “Turkish Nation”³ were searched, in Turkish, with the purpose of surveying the public’s opinion about the impact of Syrian refugees on their nation state.

Out of thirty posts, eleven posts expressed the need for empathising with refugees in the country and finding sustainable and inclusive solutions to ensure their security. Nineteen posts ranged from explicit hate speeches to expressions of dissatisfaction with the presence of Syrian refugees in the country. Five of the nineteen anti-immigration posts viewed Syrian refugees as a threat to the nation’s cohesion, unity, and even security. Terms used for Syrian refugees include: “corrupt race”, “violent”, “brutal”, “religious oppression”.

While the collected data are extremely limited and cannot be generalised into a conclusion, it provides a glimpse into the public’s perspectives of Syrian refugees. For the most part, Turks seem to perceive Syrian refugees, and all refugees in a broader scale, as a threat to their national cohesion and security. The belief that Syrian refugees are violent and brutal allows Turks to exclude them from their society and treat them as the unwanted other who must leave at once.

Such embedded beliefs cannot be easily changed, especially with the rising voice of the Victory Party, Zafer Partisi, Good Party (IP), and the Republican People’s Party (CHP) (Duran, 2023) which explicitly disseminate hate speeches towards refugees, exacerbating xenophobia and exclusion (Bandur, 2020, pp. 69-70).

3.1. Gendered impact of anti-immigration sentiments on Syrian refugees

Given that in almost all societal issue women face harsher consequences, Syrian women in Türkiye suffer from cultural and structural exclusion, violence, and exploitation. Such problems are exemplified in rape, forced and child marriage, sex trafficking and forced prostitution, in addition to hate speeches (Cankurtaran & Albayrak, 2019; Spencer, 2015).

2014 UNHCR interviews of Syrian families in Türkiye reported that families resorted to accepting child marriage due to harsh economic conditions (Spencer, 2015, p. 7). Since child marriages are unlawful in Türkiye, such marriages are unregistered leaving minor girls vulnerable to GBV and unable to seek legal protection (Spencer, 2015, p. 8).

³ The words searched for were: “Süryalı Mülteciler”, “Süryalı Kadınlar” and “Türk Milletine”.

Another related issue is rape of Syrian refugees in Türkiye. The Gender-based Violence Information Management System considers intercourse with minors as rape regardless of whether such intercourse was carried out within or outside marriage, since a minor does not have the ability to fully comprehend the act (Spencer, 2015, p. 9). Thus, all Syrian refugees' child marriage is considered in itself rape. Yet, rape of Syrian women in Türkiye is not limited to child marriage.

Yet, violence and rape of Syrian women in Türkiye is not limited within child marriage. Several Syrian women refugees in Türkiye stated that they suffer from GBV and DV by their Turkish spouse (Zambrana, 2016). In most cases, women stated that they were unable to report such violence because they either do not have official documents to turn to authorities, or that their marriage is not legally documented (Zambrana, 2016).

Coupled with structural insecurities, societal revulsion and stereotypes are other factors adding to gendered impacts of Syrian migrants in Syria. On the one hand, hate speeches and exclusion is directed to Syrian refugees from women (Pelé, 2020). For instance, Turkish women perceive the way Syrian women wear their headscarf as unfit to the society merely because it is distinct from the Turkish style (Pelé, 2020). Turkish women have also stated their fear that Syrian women arrived to Türkiye to “steal” their husbands (Pelé, 2020). Such stereotypes and intolerance of the other lead to further grievances and hate.

Thus, it could be observed that Syrian women in Türkiye suffer from intersective forms of inequalities and oppression, due to being refugees, Arabs, and women. Under such disadvantages, refugee women are subject to forms of oppression that cannot be treated separately but must be equally acknowledged. Intersectional feminism has the advantage of acknowledging this distinctive lens.

5. The relevance of intersectional feminism to the question of anti-immigration

From the above collected and provided data, it is evident that Syrian women in Türkiye face perpetrated violence, while Turkish nationals view Syrians as the “violent” individuals. Thus, it is not enough for the government to endorse inclusive policies, rather it has to shed the light on the intersectional inequalities which immigrants face in Türkiye.

Introducing social media platforms that sheds the light on the humanity issues which refugees, in general, face in Türkiye would facilitate inducing sympathy towards those groups.

Instead of framing immigration as an issue that needs government intervention, there must be acknowledgement of the need for societal inclusion of those groups. Feminist activists in Türkiye must raise the voice of vulnerable groups to ensure fair inclusion into the Turkish society. Employing social media platforms to counter the voice of anti-immigration sentiments is a plausible solution for the rise of hate speeches and anti-immigration sentiments in social media platforms, owing to the paramount link between social media platforms attitudes and society attitudes (Matamoros-Fernández & Farkas, 2021). Social media platforms have been constantly referred to as intermediaries that influence the public opinion of broader societies (Jean & Axel, 2015).

6. Conclusion

The abovementioned structural and cultural issues are mere glimpses of the reality, they do not reflect the harsh conditions which women refugees in Türkiye, or anywhere, face. However, such issue does not exist without a possible sustainable solution, nor does it exist without contest from other Turkish individuals who believe in the supremacy of human rights above national identity. Intersectional feminism would allow for spreading awareness and emphasising the need for inclusivity.

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Sino-Russian interactions amid the Ukrainian conflict: a relationship “with limits”

Ahmed Essam Abd El Fattah

Introduction

The nature of China’s interactions with Russia has always been characterized by complexity, and the conflict in Ukraine has emerged to be an important geopolitical turning point, offering valuable insights toward understanding this intricate relationship. The main question of the paper is what are the dynamics and factors shaping China’s interaction with Russia during the Ukrainian conflict? The paper will answer this question through a qualitative analysis of China’s official statements and actions toward Russia amid the Ukrainian conflict. To explain that theoretically, the research will use insights from two theories. The research will use a revised version of the power transition theory, which encompasses not only the concept of "Rising Great powers" but also that of "Declining great powers". These concepts will be important in shaping how the relationship works. In addition, the paper will use prospect theory to explain why, even though both countries are dissatisfied with the US-led order, their actions and strategies are distinct and how that will reflect on the dynamics of their relationship.

The main argument of the paper is that two competing factors can explain China’s position on the war in Ukraine and shape the nature of its interaction with Russia. The first is China’s recognition that Russia is a necessary partner in transforming the international world order. The second is the divergent power trajectories of the two countries which dictate the extent to which each is willing to challenge the hegemon. China’s rise makes it exhibit a risk-averse behavior, while Russia’s decline will compel it to engage in risky actions. However, While China free-rides on the US-led order, China would also still want to free-ride on Russia's anti-hegemonic actions and these two competing motives will shape the nature of China’s interaction with Russia. Given these two competing factors, China will support Russia but only in areas and manners that incur China minimal cost. Rhetorically, China has reiterated the Russian narrative of the war, but still refrained from explicitly siding with Russia. In behavior, china has increased its trade with Russia, especially in oil but refrained from providing weapons and condemned Russia’s nuclear threats or actions.

The paper will be divided as follows: First, it will outline the main assumptions of power transition theory and prospect theory that will be utilized in the paper. Second, the paper will provide evidence for the assumption that China is rising and Russia is declining. Third, the paper will explain the deep relationship between China and Russia and how that presents a dilemma for China in the Russian-Ukrainian war. To manage this dilemma, the paper will explain how China applies a “cautious support” strategy. Finally, a conclusion will be given.

Theoretical framework

The theory of power transition falls under the overarching framework of systemic theories in the field of international relations. In contrast to the idea of structural realism and balance of power that the international system is anarchic (Mearsheimer, 1994), power transition theory posits that the international system exhibits a noticeable hierarchy (Kugler & Organski, 1989, P. 172).

Within this hierarchical structure, each state is assigned to a certain category. At the top of this hierarchical structure lies the dominant state (the hegemon), which holds the highest degree of power within the given system (Kugler & Organski, 1989, P. 173). The hegemonic power establishes and enforces the regulations that govern the global order, so ensuring the maintenance of peace and stability within the international system (Kugler & Organski, 1989, P. 173). Beneath the hegemonic state, exists a set of great powers. Each is powerful, but none can match the hegemon's power alone. (Kugler & Organski, 1989, P. 173). Finally, there are the middle and small powers (Kugler & Organski, 1989, P. 173).

According to the theory, preserving peace and stability in the international system is contingent upon this hierarchical arrangement of states (Kugler & Organski, 1989). For a transition of power to occur, two conditions must be fulfilled. The first is for a great power to achieve power parity with the dominant power (Kugler & Organski, 1989). The second is developing a sense of dissatisfaction with the international system (Kugler & Organski, 1989).

According to Kugler & Organski (1989), in situations when Great powers experience substantial growth in their power coupled with dissatisfaction with the prevailing conditions, they will tend to adopt a challenging stance towards the hegemonic power. The dominant state is anticipated to oppose such challenges due to its vested interest in preserving the existing state of affairs and extending its dominance (Kugler & Organski, 1989).

However, the theory overlooked two important things. First, is the fact that within the category of “great powers”, there are not just rising powers, there are also declining powers (Krickovic, 2017). While the original version of the theory expected the rising powers to be the main challengers and focused mainly on the dynamics of interaction between the hegemon and the rising power during the process of power transition, little attention was given to the importance of declining powers and the dynamics between the rising power (China) and the declining power (Russia) during the process of power transition. Still, Power transition theory provides useful insights into concepts like power, hierarchy, and dissatisfaction which will set the general framework of the paper.

The second issue is that rising power may not always be confrontational. The fact that it still rising, in fact, reduces its incentive to confront. To address this second issue, the paper will integrate prospect theory into the framework of power transition theory. According to Prospect Theory, individuals and entities, such as states, exhibit a preference for avoiding losses (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Levy, 1992). When confronted with potential losses, they tend to adopt a more risk-seeking behavior, whereas, in the face of prospective gains, they tend to adopt a more cautious and risk-averse stance (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Levy, 1992). To put it simply, different power trajectories dictate to what extent a great power is willing to take risks (Krickovic & Zhang, 2020). Given that China is in the domain of gains, it will avoid directly challenging the US. Conversely, since Russia is in the domain of losses it will be more risk-acceptant. The relationship between Russia and China will reflect this rationale.

Divergent Trajectories: China's Rise and Russia's Decline

Power is the capacity of a country to exert influence on the actions of another country in pursuit of its objectives (Tammen et al., 2017). Although the notion is simple to comprehend, its measurement is complicated. While no single set of indicators can fully capture all aspects of a country's power, examining factors such as the economy, military strength, and technological advancement can provide valuable insights.

In terms of the economy, Over the past decades, the trajectory of China’s share in the global GDP (adjusted for PPP) has shown a notable upward trend, rising from 7.24% in 2000 to 18.48 % in 2022 (International Monetary Fund, 2023). On the other hand, Russia's share has remained relatively stable going from 3.04% in 2000 only to 2.92% in 2022 (IMF, 2023). Furthermore,

While China has a diversified economy, Russia significantly depends on income generated from the oil and natural gas sectors, which represented 45% of Russia's federal budget in 2021 (IEA, 2022).

Russia's decline relative to China and the United States is even more apparent when we consider their respective advances in science and technology. This is particularly significant since these domains are becoming vital for economic growth and the expansion of national strength and influence. According to the 2022 Global Innovation Index, China attained the 11th position in the overall ranking up from its previous standing of 34th in the 2012 edition of the index (Dutta et al., 2022). On the other hand, the rating of Russia has shown little change, with a modest shift from the 51st position in 2012 to the 47th position in 2022 (Dutta et al., 2022).

While Russia's military strength remains the country's greatest asset, there are indications that its military capabilities are beginning to deteriorate. In 2022, Russia's military expenditure amounted to 86.4 billion U.S. dollars, representing only around 29% of China's military expenditures in the same year, which reached 292 billion U.S. dollars (Tian et al., 2022). Moreover, the war in Ukraine has further impacted the army, leaving them with no choice but to resort to the reserve troops and reserve equipment (VOA News, 2022).

Sino-Russian relations amid the Ukrainian conflict: Partnership with limits

Since the end of the Cold War, the bilateral relations between Russia and China have been experiencing a notable transition characterized by a steady trajectory of strengthening their ties (Rashid & Tahir, 2021). Over time, the nature of their relationship evolved from being primarily focused on pragmatic economic considerations to a shared vision for a new global order. The deepening of this relationship has been especially evident after the conflict in Ukraine, as the interactions between these two significant global actors have become noticeably more aligned. This was particularly evident when both sides agreed to deepen their "Comprehensive Strategic Partnership for a New Era" (The State Council of the People's Republic of China, 2023). Russia and China share two main commonalities. First, is their dissatisfaction with the US-Led order. The second is their shared long-term goal of having a world that better recognizes their great power status.

Since the war started, China's foreign policy toward the war exhibited a notable contradiction (MCMANUS, 2022). China seeks to present itself as a neutral state. However, given that reducing the global influence of the United States and transforming the world order into a multipolar one is a key objective in China's foreign policy agenda, maintaining full neutrality in a case that involves both Russia (a strategic partner for a new era) and the US (the hegemon) is a missed opportunity for China (MCMANUS, 2022). For that reason, China has shown a willingness to provide support to Russia, but only in domains and manners that would incur China minimal reputational and economic costs. The explanation for this is that, despite its dissatisfaction with certain aspects of the global order, China continues to feel optimistic about the possibility of future improvements to its position without confrontation. Based on the assumptions of prospect theory, China is showing risk-averse behavior because of the country's position is in the domain of gains (Krickovic & Zhang, 2020). They exhibit a reluctance to engage in risky status-seeking activities since doing so may jeopardize the nation's prospective gains (Krickovic & Zhang, 2020).

Areas of indirect support

Rhetorically, China has given support to Russia in several instances. First, China refused to call it an invasion or a war. The same was also true in its “12-point peace plan” for Ukraine. While not explicitly siding with Russia, China has used a discourse that exhibits a “Pro-Russia neutrality” stance. On the one hand, China has included, in point no.2, the notion that security is indivisible and emphasized on Russia's "legitimate security concerns" to be treated seriously (Greitens, 2022). In doing so, china was reiterating the Russian narrative of the war, implicitly legitimizing it. China's support for Russia was not limited only to this particular discourse; it also included, in points no.10 and no.11, criticism of unilateral sanctions and politicizing the economic institutions, and that was clearly targeted toward Western countries (Greitens, 2022). On the other hand, China tried to show some neutrality by supporting the international law principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity, however, without mentioning the sovereignty of which country (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, 2023). This "pro-Russia neutrality" approach (Kozyrev, 2023) put China in a position where it is implicitly supporting Russia but in a way trying not explicitly to challenge the United States. The same dynamics were featured in their economic relationship.

The economic relationship has been characterized by providing help to Russia in some areas, enabling it to indirectly alleviate the consequences of sanctions, but strategically avoiding involvement in other high-risk areas that may entangle China in the conflict. While the economic relationship between China and Russia existed before the war, the war triggered a fast upward-sloping increase in their trade relationship. In the year 2022, Bilateral trade between Russia and China reached a record high of USD 190.27 billion, showing a substantial rise of 29.5 percent compared to the same period in the year before the war and, in 2023 the Overall trade between China and Russia recorded a new record of \$240 billion, growing 26.3% from 2022 (General Administration of Customs China, 2023). Chinese exports to Russia increased 46.9% in 2023 from a year earlier, and increased 64.2% compared with 2021, before the Ukrainian conflict (Reuters, 2024).

Moreover, As European Union countries stopped importing Russian oil and gas, finding an alternative market was a major concern in Russia's thinking. In this context, China emerged as a key player. The purchase of Russian crude oil by China has shown a notable upward trend amidst the ongoing conflict. During the first half of 2023, China's oil imports from Russia amounted to 2.13 million barrels per day (bpd), surpassing Saudi Arabia, making Russia the largest crude oil provider to China in 2023 (Lin & McMillan, 2023).

The limits of the partnership

While China and Russia frame their relations as one with “No-limits”, evidence showed two main redlines in China's support for Russia. The first is regarding the sending of lethal weapons to Russia. The Chinese former foreign minister Qin Gang and the current foreign minister Wang Yi both stressed that China does not and will not send lethal weapons to the parties involved in the conflict (AP, 2023). They also declared the intention to monitor and control the export of dual-use items. (AP, 2023). This is mainly to avoid reputational and economic costs as the US warned that severe sanctions would be imposed if China provided military aid to Russia (Coles & Hutzler, 2023). Given the massive weight of the economic relationship between China and The US and EU, China makes sure not to over support Russia. Jake Sullivan, the national security advisor of the white house confirmed there is no evidence for support so far but added “We are watching closely”.

The other area of concern for China is the use or threat of nuclear weapons. In the early months of the war, Russia was seen to be taking some serious actions regarding nuclear weapons, such as shipping tactical nuclear weapons to Belarus (Sky News, 2023), stepping out of the treaty on the test ban (Starchack, 2023) and star testing and rehearsing (Wright, 2023), actions around Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant and finally the threat of using the nuclear force. In response, When President Xi Jinping met German Chancellor Olaf Scholz in Beijing, he made it clear that he opposed the use of nuclear force in Europe, remarking on Russia’s actions (BLOOMBERG, 2022). This was also clear in the “12 points peace plan” by China, point no.7 and no,8., indicating that Beijing is concerned about Russia's risky moves despite its tacit support for Moscow (Seddon et al. 2023). Moreover, a few articles reported that Xi Jinping himself personally warned Putin against the use of nuclear weapons in Ukraine. This topic is important for China not only to avoid sanctions and criticism from the West but also since any nuclear escalation can hamper China's potential rise.

Conclusion

China and Russia express dissatisfaction with the prevailing international system led by the United States. However, both are challenging it differently. The power trajectory of a country plays a significant role in determining the level of risk it is willing to undertake. However, because both share the same goal, China sought to capitalize on Russia's anti-hegemonic measures while avoiding the potential repercussions that may arise from such acts (see figure 1).




Figure 1

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The impact of the Russian-Ukrainian war on the Israeli aggression: revival of Aaliyah

Laila Khaled Hussein

Introduction

The Russian-Ukrainian war took place on the 24th of February 2022. Since then, the escalation of the conflict led many Ukrainian civilians to flee and cross borders to the nearest states such as Hungary, Romania, Slovakia, etc. or even seeking refuge in other far states such as France, Germany, Italy, and Israel (UNHCR, 2022).

Under the Israeli “law of return,” Israel was able to receive thousands of Jewish Ukrainian refugees encouraging the Aaliyah (Gross, 2022; UNHCR, 2022; Winer, 2022). On the other side, 2,700 dwelling units in illegal settlements in the occupied West Bank have been granted Israeli approval (McKernan, 2022).

This paper questions to what extent did the Russian-Ukrainian war impact the Israeli aggression on the Palestinians and increase the creation of settlements? Moreover, to what extent can religious and ethnic identities shape the Ukrainian Jews’ Aaliyah to Israel and the Palestinian refugees’ crisis that was even widened by the Ukrainian refugees’ crisis?

This paper uses qualitative data based on secondary sources such as academic articles, scholarly work, and international and local online news. A definition of the concepts of “Aaliyah” and the “right to return” law will be provided. The assumptions of the constructivist theory will be applied to the selected case. Therefore, this paper placed two hypotheses in which their viability is going to be tested throughout the paper.

H1: The Israeli government considered the Russian-Ukrainian war as a motive to encourage Aaliyah, as well as taking the Ukrainian refugees' crisis to build more settlements on the West Bank and evict more Palestinians, which widened the Palestinian displacement crisis.

H2: Religious and ethnic identities were able to shape the encouragement of the Ukrainian Jews to refute in Israel, as well as explaining the reasons behind widening the Palestinian displacement crisis

Finally, the paper is divided into five sections. Section A reviews the literature on the refugees’ crisis caused by the Russian invasion of Ukraine and its impact on some European states

such as Moldova. Section B is a conceptual framework that defines “Aaliyah,” the “Right to Return” law, and the concept of identity while focusing on religious and ethnic identities. Section C is a theoretical framework that discusses the assumptions of Constructivist theory. Lastly, Sections D and E review the case study in depth while applying the assumptions of the concepts of ethnic and religious identities and the constructivist theory on it.

Section A: Literature review

This section is dedicated to review the literature written on the Ukrainian refugees’ crisis. Despite the fact that the literature on this specified crisis is not massive as it is a recent phenomenon, it caught interest among various authors such as Näre, Abdelhady, and Irastorza (2022), Bremmer (2022), and Secrieru (2022).

For example, authors like Näre et al (2022) compare between the European states’ reaction to Ukrainian refugees, who originally came from the global North, versus their reaction towards refugees from the global South like Syria. They also added that the Ukrainian refugees crisis was able to show the European racism and hypocrisy; as they sympathized more with the Ukrainian refugees but over-problematized the existence of refugees from southern states (Näre et al., 2022). Other authors such as Secrieru (2022) believed that since World War II, the war has caused the largest regional population displacement. He also believed that this humanitarian crisis has negatively impacted the European economy, security and demography with the significant number of refugees’ flows (Secrieru, 2022). Secrieru (2022) also showed in his work the enormous amount of refugees that went to Eastern European states such as Moldova, which received approximately half a million Ukrainians, Armenia, which received 489 refugees, and Azerbaijan, which received 4639 refugees. Other authors such as Bremmer (2022) believed that many states are skeptic of the United Nations’ role in resolving the Russian-Ukrainian war crisis; as they were not able, according to the Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky, to protect Ukraine and prevent any violence that took place. He also added that in the next years there were be more displaced refugees, along with the refugees who were displaced due to wars and conflicts, due to other types of crises such as the climate and water scarcity crises (Bremmer, 2022).

The literature on the Ukrainian refugees’ crisis focused mainly on its impact on Europe. However, it did not tackle its impact on Middle Eastern states such as Israel and the increasing settlements despite of the large number of refugees that went to Israel.

Section B: Conceptual framework: “Aaliyah,” “The right to return,” and “Identity”

Aaliyah and The right to return are interrelated. Richard and Carolyn Hyde (2012, p.1) claim that ““Aliyah” is the Hebrew word for “ascent,” coming from the same Hebrew root as the word “la-alot” (“to ascend”) or “ma-alot,” as in the “Psalms of Ascent” (Psalms 120-134) which were recited by pilgrims on their way up to Jerusalem for the great feasts.” Recently, Aaliyah is referring to the act of Jews migrating from all over the world, after being scattered, to their claimed homeland “Israel” (Hyde & Hyde, 2012). This form of migration is considered as a fulfilment of God’s words (Hyde & Hyde, 2012). Aaliyah waves began to take place since the late 19th Century till the Mid-20th Century before the declaration of the state of Israel resulting in the immigration of roughly 543,000 Jews (Neuman, 1999). Neuman (1999) also claimed that the state of Israel has always been encouraging and helping Jews worldwide to migrate and be absorbed in the Jewish community and placed Aaliyah as one of the most fundamental Israeli policies. Accordingly, the Israeli Law of return was established to claim that “Every Jew has the right to come to this country as an *oleh* ” (The Knesset, 1950). This law also claims that all Jews who wish to settle in Israel will be given the *oleh*’s visa as long as these citizens do not cause any harms to the public health or the states security, or be engaged in any activities that could harm the Jewish community(The Knesset, 1950).

Coming to the concept of identity in politics, it has diversity in its meanings and classifications. For example, the "identity politics" of race, gender, and sexuality have received a great deal of recent scholarly attention with interest in politics. "Identity" is a key concept in comparative politics research on nationalism and ethnic strife (Fearon, 1999). The concept of "state identity" is central to constructivist critiques of realism and assessments of state sovereignty in international relations. And in political theory, disputes on gender, sexuality, nationalism, ethnicity, and culture in relation to liberalism and its alternatives frequently centre on "identity" issues (Fearon, 1999). This paper is hence going to focus on ethnic and religious identities.

According to Baumann (Baumann, 2004), cultural anthropology has been defining ethnicity at its best, but this concept has been extensively debated, and there is no determined theory or explanation of how ethnic communities are created. While the term "ethnicity" is relatively new, first appearing in the Oxford English Dictionary in 1953, John Hutchinson and Anthony Smith

claim that it shares English roots with the term "ethnic," which has been in use since the Middle Ages (Baumann, 2004). The term "ethnos," which was used to describe a group, tribe, race, people, or swarm, can be linked to Greece as the original source of the word ethnic (Baumann, 2004). The concept of "ethnicity" fits into the "Us" and "Them" split in more recent colonial and immigration history. The majority, "Us," is perceived as non-ethnic, whereas new immigrants or minorities, "Them," are perceived as ethnic. The phrase has evolved to include synonyms such as ethnic identity, ethnic origin, ethnocentrism, and ethnicism (Baumann, 2004). An individual's ancestry is referred to as their ethnic identity or origin. Ethnocentrism is the idea that one's ethnic group or origin is superior to all others, which leads to disapproval or hostility of any objects, actions, or physical traits that are dissimilar to one's own (Baumann, 2004).

Coming to religious identity, Werbner (Werbner, 2009) refers to a specific perspective on "difference." In terms of limits, relatedness and otherness, encompassment and inclusiveness, and the strong forces that are thought to threaten, contest, and maintain these divisions and unities, religious identity is primarily a discourse. In this regard, the relationship between religion and identity is both more and less than religion, understood generally as a way of life related to the sacred that permeates all aspects of existence, and identity, understood as the centre of the self and subjectivity (Werbner, 2009). It also arises whenever groups have divisions or sectarian conflicts, or when they engage in fierce and occasionally violent identity disputes within themselves, even when doctrinal differences appear to be slight (Werbner, 2009). All the concepts mentioned above will be used throughout the paper in order to better analyse the case and test the viability of the hypotheses.

Section C: Conceptual framework: The Social Constructivist theory

According to Blanton and Kegley (Blanton & Kegley, 2017) and Sørensen and Jackson (2019), Constructivism emphasises the significance of common beliefs, customs, and identities that are formed amongst the international actors via their interactions when analysing international instances. Constructivism as a theory began to significantly emerge and gain popularity in the early years of the 1980s (Sørensen & Jackson, 2006). According to Adler, as cited by Jung (Jung, 2019) constructivism is the notion that "dynamic normative and epistemic interpretations of the material world determine how this material world is formed and altered by human behaviour and interaction. Moreover, according to Price and Reus-Smit, as cited by Jung (2019), constructivism

adopts a sociological perspective on world politics, emphasising the significance of normative along with material structures, and the role of identity in the constitutional framework of interests and action. Wendt builds constructivist theory with identities and interests as the dependent variable, in opposition to the liberal notion that "international institutions can transform state identities and interests," drawing on the sociological symbolic interactionist perspective (Jung, 2019). According to Wendt, "Identities are the basis of interests" and "Actors do not have a portfolio of interests that they carry around independently of social context; rather, they define their interests in the process of defining situation" Conversely, in Katzenstein's book, identity and domestic characteristics are tightly related. In other words, identity is frequently defined as "varying constructions of statehood" and "varying national ideologies of collective distinctiveness and purpose" between nations; hence, these variations generate state interests that further affect state policy (Jung, 2019). Despite that the constructivist has lots of points of strengths such as providing an understanding that politics are not just material and that norms, identities and interests play in important role in shaping politics, it has some weaknesses in regards to "not specifying the existence, let alone precise nature, of its main causal/constitutive elements: identities, norms, values, and social structure" (Jung, 2019). Furthermore, constructivism could also be criticised for being sometimes perceived as an inherent flaw and is referred to as "selection bias" (Jung, 2019). Finally, since that social constructivism focus on factors such as identity and norms, this theory is going to be used along with the previously mentioned concepts in order to analyse the selected case study.

Section D: The Ukrainian refugees' crisis and the increase in the Israeli settlements

Consequently, to the war in Ukraine, lots of states received Ukrainian refugees such as Israel. Early in March 2022, the Israeli Supreme Court obliged the government to remove any restrictions on the Ukrainian immigration to Israel leading to an unlimited entry of refugees to Israel, where Zelensky described Israel after this obligation as a "true developed democracy (Zelensky, 2022). Afterwards on the 13th of March 2022, it was reported that the arrival of thousands of Jewish Ukrainian refugees in Israel was considered as reaching the maximum number of Jewish refugees that Israel said it could receive (Winer, 2022). However, the Interior Minister Ayelet Shaked claimed that Israel will permit 20,000 Ukrainians who were in the state either illegally or on visas for tourism prior to the Russian invasion to stay, and additionally offer visas to an estimated 5,000 non-Jewish refugees who have fled the conflict (Winer, 2022). In a

statement, the Israeli Minister of Immigration and Absorption Pnina Tamano-Shata claimed that receiving more than 15,000 Ukrainian refugees is considered as a national pride to Israel (Gross, 2022). Since working-age men have found it difficult to flee due to the Ukraine's restrictive legislations, the majority of Ukrainian refugees are women, children, and elderly people. According to the Israeli ministry of Immigration and Absorption, women have immigrated twice as often as men (Gross, 2022). A quarter of the 15,000 immigrants from Ukraine, Russia, and Belarus are under the age of 18, and 18% are older than 66 (Gross, 2022). According to the ministry, Netanya has emerged as the most popular state for refugees to settle, with around 1,543 refugees deciding to stay in coastal cities. Unexpectedly, the other leading locales are Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, and Haifa (Gross, 2022).

Recently, statistics showed that the Israeli population increased in the years 2022 and 2023 in comparison to other years marking 9,201,923 (Worldometer, 2023). Therefore, it can be noticed consequently that the number of the Israeli settlements in the Palestinian lands increased. As the Israeli government announced 12,855 housing units in the West Bank during the initial half of 2023, marking the highest record in terms of the settlements proved, among which 9,805 were for deposits and 3,500 were for validation (Peace Now, 2023). Israel until this moment is creating settlements and easing the settling process for the settlers despite the condemnation of some states such as the United States (Kershner, 2023). Accordingly, thousands of the Jewish refugees resided in settlements on the West Bank such as the Libensons family who performed Aaliyah after the Russian-Ukrainian war and stayed on Neve Daniel settlement on the West Bank (Sharon, 2022). The Libensons, who lived less than 15 kilometers southeast of Jerusalem, denied Palestinians the right to their lands, claiming Jews had religious rights (Sharon, 2022). Therefore, with the increasing population in Israel, especially after the Ukrainian refugees that Israel received, Israel had more motive to create more settlements.

Section E: How identity played a role in Israel's decision: Ukrainian refugees & settlements

Upon reviewing Israel's decision to receive Ukrainian Jewish refugees is the common spiritual beliefs presented in sharing the same religion which is Judaism. According to a demographic assessment of European Jews conducted in 2020, 43,000 Ukrainians self-identify as Jews; however, other estimates quadruple that figure for those with Jewish ancestry (Friedman, 2022). Moreover, the Ukrainian president Zelensky is the first Jewish president of Ukraine, who,

despite not being very religious, kept referring recently to his Jewish identity several times and even affirmed the solidarity between Ukraine and Israel several times (Friedman, 2022). Additionally, some of the Jewish refugees, such as the Libensons, believe in their right to return and settle on the West Banks territories due to the Judaism claim that it is their promised land (Sharon, 2022). Therefore, the religious identity played here an important role.

Furthermore, the Ukrainian Jews' origin is from the Ashkenazi Jews who came from Poland (Rapawy, 1997). Hence, it is estimated that Israel favoured their reception; as Israel has been established and ruled by Ashkenazi for a long time. Moreover, it was always rooted in the Israeli absorption plan to attract Jews who originated from the former Soviet Union States such as Ukraine as a way for encouraging Aaliyah (Davidovich, 2011). Therefore, it is shown that ethnic identity was able to shape Israel's decision. This also proved that the assumptions of the constructivist theory regarding how identity and beliefs can shape state's decisions such as in this case.

Coming to Israel's decision to take the Ukrainian refugees crisis as a motive to build more settlements on the West Bank, there are several reasons based on ethnic and religious identities. One of the main reason behind creating these settlements is the Israeli nationalist belief that Jews lived long time ago on the lands of the West Bank, denouncing the legitimacy of the Jordanian rule from 1928 to 1967 and the belonging of the West Bank to the Palestinians (Kershner, 2023). This belief was clearly stated in the speech of the ultranationalist Minister of National Security Itamar Ben-Gvir, where he encouraged the settlers to establish more settlements by saying "run for the hilltops." (Kershner, 2023). Moreover, Israel placed a condition for the acceptance of the Ukrainian refugees in which they must have at least one Jewish grandparent or a relative; however, Palestinians who have Israeli relatives, as spouses for example, cannot live in the occupied territories (Bashi, 2022). Another thing is that Israel received Ukrainian Jews in order to protect them from being killed in the war; and on the other hand, the Israeli soldiers and settlers kill and assault numerous amount of Palestinians and forcefully evict them from their homes, as what happened in Jenin camp in 2023 resulting in the existence of around 4000 Palestinian refugees (Irfan, 2023). Therefore, it could be clearly shown how religious and ethnic identities have a great role in reshaping Israel's decision in increasing the amount of settlements built in the West Bank. It was clearly proved that the assumptions of the Constructivist theory could be applied on this case; as beliefs and identity were able to shape how Israel took this decision.

Additional section: Post the 7th of October events

On the 7th of October, 2023, Hamas led an attack on the Southern parts of Israel and captured various hostages (International Crisis Group, 2023). As a result, Israel fiercely launched an attack on Gaza leading to a total destruction in every inch of the city (International Crisis Group, 2023). Suddenly Ukrainian Jewish refugees found themselves just escaping a war just to go through another war (Sazonov, 2024). However, how did the ongoing event impact the Ukrainian Jews' migration to Israel? Some Ukrainian Jews who fled to Israel such as Sansov (2024) believe that despite her two states are now in wars, she feels that these wars add to her pride. Moreover, she believed that both wars shared strategic and political connections, referring to the ties between Russia and Iran and threats that both states impose on Ukraine and Israel (Sazonov, 2024). In addition to this, The District Court in Tel Aviv decided, during the first period on 2024, to grant all Ukrainian refugees in Israel 2A5 visas, that guarantees them numerous rights and opportunities as work, bank accounts and health insurance (The Embassy of Ukraine in Israel, 2024).

On the other hand, some settlers fled Israel after the 7th of October events, some of them were Ukrainian refugees such as Tetiana Kocheva and Anna Lyashko (Asharq Al-Awsat, 2023). Kocheva and Lyashko both claimed that she fled the war in Ukraine just to find herself in another war. She also added that she would rather die on her homeland in Kiev than dying in another land claiming that the situation in Ukraine is calmer than in Israel (Asharq Al-Awsat, 2023).

The previous paragraphs shows how ethnic and religious identities played a role with some of the Ukrainian Jews; as they refused to leave Israel and stayed in the settlements, such in Sazonov's case. However, it was also proven that religious and ethnic identities were not enough to persuade other Ukrainian Jews, as Kocheva and Lyashko, to stay in Israel.

Conclusion

To conclude, this paper was able to prove its two hypotheses. Where this paper strongly believes that the Ukrainian refugees' crisis had a great impact on the settlements' policies in Israel; as the reception of large fluxes of Ukrainian Jewish refugees has indirectly given Israel a greater motive to increase the amount of settlements built in the West Bank, resulting in the widening of the Palestinian refugees' crisis. The paper also believes that religious and ethnic identities play a great role in shaping the decisions and actions of Israel in the case of the refugees and the

settlements. However, other way round, this paper proved that religious and ethnic identities had a partial effect on Ukrainian Jewish refugees in Israel; as identity was not a great motive to stop some of them from fleeing after the 7th of October events. This paper was limited by the time and the limitation of sources that discuss merely this topic. Therefore, it is recommended that more research should be done on this topic with more time and access to various sources to be able to build on this topic.

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Understanding Indigenous Self-Determination in Nunavut: The Impact of Climate Change on Inuits' Culture

Enji Matar

Introduction

Global warming has been severely impacting Inuit communities in Canada, and Nunavut is no exception. Inuits are a group of indigenous populations in the Arctic and subarctic that occupy most of Greenland and parts of the US, Canada, and Russia (Inuit Circumpolar Council & Williamson, 2023). The Nunavut region is one of four regions that Inuits inhabit in Canada: Nunavut, Nunatsiavut, Nunavik, and Inuvialuit (Spitzer, 2020). Together, these four constitute the “Nunangat” region in Northern Canada (Spitzer, 2020).

This paper aims to explore the relationship between self-determination/self-governance, climate change, and culture. Therefore, it answers the following two questions: 1) what is the impact of climate change on Nunavut Inuit culture? 2) to what extent does Nunavut’s degree of autonomy/self-determination increase/decrease this impact? The paper argues that climate change impacts culture negatively in Nunavut. The areas explored are hunting, fishing, language, sewing, berry-picking, and arts. The paper further argues that relying on federal resources, lack of ability to set gas prices, and colonial history undermine Nunavut’s self-determination, which exacerbates the impact of climate change. However, the region has a degree of autonomy, but the territorial government does not always act in-line with the people’s will.

The paper is divided into five main sections. The first section defines culture and selfdetermination. The following four sections examine the cultural impact of climate change on Nunavut and how the amount of autonomy Inuits have shape this impact; The second section focuses on hunting and fishing, the third on language, the fourth on sewing and berry-picking, and the fifth on art.

Nunavut as a Case Study

The study investigates the impact on Nunavut of climate change from 2006, until the present (2024). This is because it was in 2006 that some areas in the Nunavut region started witnessing unprecedented changes (Ford, 2009). For example, Ford (2009) found that “2006 [was]

the first year in the dataset that large areas of the Basin [were] completely ice-free. In a focus group discussion, Inuit elders likewise characterized the summer ice conditions as being unprecedented in living memory” (p. 92).

Three reasons make this study important. First the paper establishes important linkages between self-determination, Inuit culture, and climate change. The variable of self-determination have been often excluded in the literature on climate change and Inuits’ culture. Second, when linking culture and politics, it is common to focus on how culture shapes politics, which is referred to as “political culture”. However, there is a need to investigate the impact of politics on culture. Since indigenous culture is known to be attached to the land, this relationship becomes even more important to explore in light of climate change. Finally, this paper contributes to the overall literature on the impact of climate change on Nunavut Inuits’ health because culture and health are closely interrelated in this context.

Defining Culture and Self-Determination

Defining culture is challenging. It is an extremely complex concept that has been contested extensively in anthropology for decades (Hofstede, 2003; White, 1959; Eagleton, 2016). For the sake of simplicity, and since defining culture is not a primary objective of this study, this paper defines culture as “the values, customs, beliefs, and symbolic practices by which men and women live (Eagleton, 2016). This definition is broad enough to encompass the various aspects included in this study. It also includes both sexes, which is crucial since some cultural practices in this study are gendered. Such a definition because it also broad enough to encompass distinct aspects of society, whether religious, familial, or even political. Meanwhile, indigenous communities’ self determination is defined as “the right to freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development” (UNHR, 2013).

Methodology

This paper relies on secondary data. It uses information from mostly journal articles, as well as books. It uses case study qualitative method by focusing on the single case of Nunavut. Additionally, it uses governmental and NGOs’ websites to help fill in the gap in the literature on self-determination.

Hunting and Fishing

Some of the most impacted aspects of Nunavut's culture are hunting and fishing. Both are the jobs of men, and both rely on Inuit Knowledge (IK) (i.e., traditional knowledge of Inuits) (Ford et al., 2007). Due to climate change, the ice is thinner, and it breaks more easily (Wesche & Chan, 2010). This reduces hunters' and fishers' abilities to do their jobs (Wesche & Chan, 2010). Since these are the main sources of local food, climate change therefore affects food security and in turn, physical and mental health (Ford et al., 2007). One Inuit member said that there has "hardly been any Igloolik people hunting walrus this year [in the summer] because there has been no ice at all" (Ford, 2009). Another said: "This is the first time in my life that I have gone without aged walrus meat." (Ford, 2009, p. 92).

Such changes also shape Inuit traditional knowledge. Because traveling on ice is now more dangerous, the younger generation has less time to gain hunting and fishing experience (Ford et al., 2007). This destroys the cultural knowledge system. The younger generation also spends less time with the elderly since hunting is a means of intergenerational bonding in Nunavut (Ford et al., 2007). The elderly are also the main experts of IK (Ford et al., 2007). Thus, it is not being passed down to youngsters (Ford et al., 2007).

The quality of food has also changed. Animals such as caribou and seals are migrating away because of increased warmth (Mercer, 2018). This means that foods that are part of Inuit culture such as walrus, seals, whales, and caribous (Ford, 2009) are now less available (Ford et al., 2007). Due to food insecurity, Inuit people are sometimes forced to rely on store-bought food (Boulanger-Lapointe et al., 2019). Store-bought food has also led to increased levels of diabetes, obesity, and nutritional deficiencies among Inuits (Schiff & Schembri, 2021).

Climate change, however, does not impact generations equally. The elderly are often more resistant to store-bought food than the younger generation because the former has have been consuming traditional food for decades (Ford, 2009). As a result, the older generation is likely to be more food insecure than the younger generation.

Nunavut's low self-determination further exacerbates the impact of climate change on hunting. Hunters often travel long distances with snowmobiles (Ford, 2009). Nonetheless, many hunters cannot afford gasoline high prices (Ford, 2009). According to the Canadian government, although "gasoline prices are not federally regulated in Canada, provincial governments have authority to do so at their discretion" (Canada Energy Regulator, 2023). Nunavut does not have

such authority because it is a territory and not a province (Canada Visa Website, n.d). Nunavut Inuits have zero control over prices in their region. They therefore adhere to the market prices. This puts them at a disadvantage because wages are lower than the average in Canada, and the shipping costs are also higher, especially during bad weather conditions (Stecyk, 2018). Such conditions (e.g. storms) are magnified by climate change, meaning that it is not a one-way relationship. Additionally, quotas on hunting certain animal species aggravate the predicament of global warming on hunters (Ford et al., 2007). Animals are already becoming scarcer with global warming, and quotas rarely consider this.

Language

Language can also be impacted by climate change. The literature has been scarce on this matter. However, analysis of the impact of climate change on language in general can allow for a better understanding of its possible effects on Inuktitut (Inuit language). Climate change generally increases forced displacement when opportunities are scarce. When this happens, indigenous communities are less likely to practice their languages if they move to other areas where such a language is not understood. Reo et al. (2019) found that in Alaska, climate change's impact on Inuit traditional activities has led to a decrease in traditional language usage. This is likely to be the same in Nunavut since hunting is a means of intergenerational bonding. Language passes from the older to the younger generation through traditional activities. With hunting activities being in danger, the indigenous language is also in danger.

The lack of self-determination has proven to impact the Inuktitut language. Several studies show that Inuits in Nunavut do not feel they have self-determination (Ertman, 2023; Ritsema et al., 2015). In the education sector, Inuktitut has been largely marginalised and English has priority over it, according to many teachers (Ertman, 2023). Inuits in Nunavut have complained of lack of “educational self-determination” because they cannot teach their children the indigenous language (Ertman, 2023). In Ertman's study, which is a unique one of educational self-determination, one Inuit parent said: “We're not really achieving why we created Nunavut in the first place if I don't have a choice whether to put my boys into an education system that will support to use Inuktitut and learn in the Inuit cultural context” (2023, p. 81). Inuits perceive that they can improve the situation if they are given such autonomy: “I believe we are also a resilient people and when we have control over our lives you see the benefits”, one of the locals added (Ertman, 2023, p. 82).

Ertman notes that Inuits are not mere victims, but rather active agents of change who have been trying to advocate for their needs for years as well (2023).

There are several reasons behind this. One cited problem is the lack of resources and funding to support this (Ertman, 2023). Fundings to Nunavut government often come from the federal government (Ritsema et al., 2015). Similarly, funding for climate adaptation can reduce climate migration, but this is hindered due to the federal government's lack of sufficient funding. This reflects weak self-determination because Nunavut government cannot function without relying on the Canadian central government. Both Ertman (2023) and Hodgkins (2010) examined the lack of the federal government's funds to achieve bilingual education in Nunavut. This is in addition to other challenges such as lack qualified teachers (Hodgkins, 2010). In an older research, Berger estimated that additional \$20 million are required to reach target goals of the act (as cited in Hodgkins, 2010).

However, a shift happened in January 2024, where the Nunavut government and federal government conducted an agreement of devolution, which grants the region's Inuits the full right of self-determination (Government of Canada, 2024). This agreement is expected to create a significant change in mentioned problems. It is likely that it will create more autonomy, but not more funding.

The relationship between weak self-determination and language loss must also be seen in a colonial context. An interviewee was quoted saying that in residential schools, Inuits were taught that they "were savages, lower than people. And as a part of that [they] weren't allowed to talk [their] language, and so a lot of [them] didn't end up passing on Inuktitut to [their] children" (Ertman, 2023). Colonialism took away the Inuits' right to self-determination, which had a long term impact on the language taught in school, even by other Inuits.

However, some problems are not entirely linked to lack of self-determination, but rather misapplication of self-determination. For example, the 2020 amendment to the Education Act sets a plan for Inuktitut to be the official school language by 2039, which James Eetoolook described as a "cultural genocide" (Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, 2020). Here, the Nunavut government has control, but is against the people's will.

Impact on Women: Sewing and Picking Berries

Climate change poses challenges on sewing, which is a female-led activity. Traditionally, Nunavut women sew the skin of seals hunted by men in summer (Dowsley et al., 2011). This skin is healthy when the spring season is long enough for seals to slowly scap their furry skin during this season (Dowsley et a., 2011). When summer hits, seals get back to the water, and because springs are now shorter due to climate change, seals get back to the water before the scrapping process is done (Dowsley et al., 2011). This reduces the quality of the skin, undermining women’s cultural activities (Dowsley et al., 2011).

This is problematic for several reasons. First, sewing is a source of income for many Inuit women in Nunavut (Williamson, 2021). Second, less time in sewing means that women dedicate less time to teach youngsters the activity, preventing traditional knowledge (TK)⁴ from being sustained for generations (Dowsley et al., 2011). Moreover, low-quality skin means low-quality clothes (Dowsley et al., 2011). This prevents locally made products from being used, increasing the possibilities of using exported clothes. Ultimately, it impacts mental health. As one woman puts it: “[Sewing is] just like meditation” (Bunce et al., 2016, p. 1429).

However, it is essential to note that this work (hunting seals for skin) is problematic per se. This is because it is unsustainable (Dowsley et al., 2011). It might be argued that this tradition reduces the number of seals. Nonetheless, it is important to take into consideration the surrounding environment of Nunavut, which provides little resources for the Inuits to survive. It becomes a dilemma on whether to take policies by the government to ban seal hunting to preserve them or to maintain Nunavut’s traditions with no changes.

The literature, however, shows evidence of the effectiveness and sustainability of indigenous knowledge in mitigation and adaptation in various contexts such as Australia (Green et al., 2010), African Sahel (Nyong et al., 2007), and New Zealand (King et al., 2008). This can be attributed to 1) the long historical experience of indigenous people; 2) their reliance on natural resources; and 3) their amalgamation with nature (Gadgil et a., 1993). As a result, several scholars examined synthesising TK and modern science (Alexander et al., 2011; Jessen et al., 2021; Nakashima & Krupnik, 2018).

Berry-picking is another women-led cultural activity impacted by climate change. It is “an activity well suited to simultaneously [care] for children..... [and is] a widely accessible activity, which gives a quiet space to relax, chat with friends, and destress by losing oneself in the repetitive

⁴ I also know as folk knowledge.

motions of picking” (Bunce et al., 2016, p. 1427). Berries have a cultural significance by being used in pancakes, pies, and jam (Bunce et al., 2016). As a result, it is also important for food security. Ogawa et al. (2008) found that berries are rich in antioxidants and other essential nutrients. As a result, the impact climate change has on picking berries can lead to lack of certain nutrients. Figure 1 by Boulanger-Lapointe et al. (2019) shows the importance of berries on land and community in Nunavut. Moreover, berries are embedded in Inuit mythology. One mythology, for example, states that even monsters in Nunavut ate berries (Boas, 1901). Berry-picking is, therefore, a cultural activity that is linked to other aspects of culture.

Women have reported several problems in berry-picking due to global warming. First, since berries are significantly sensitive to weather variations, climate changes have led to the quality of berries, leading to a decrease in the number of “good” berries (Bunce et al., 2016). Second, due to the breakdown of ice, accessing berry areas has become more difficult (Bunce et al., 2016). As a result, Inuit women’s mental health was also adversely impacted by reduced berrypicking activities (Bunce et al., 2016).

Not all Inuits in Nunavut are impacted equally. For example, areas closer to Frobisher Bay have more berries than other areas, although both are in Iqaluit (Bunce et al., 2016). Bunce et al. (2016) argued that this is mainly due to the warmer microclimate and higher levels of rain in Frobisher Bay (Hanesiak et al., 2010). One Inuit woman called Leopa said that there are areas “where [she] would prefer to collect berries but [she] don’t go often because it is so far and it would cost a lot of money” (Boulanger-Lapointe, 2019, p. 89). Berry-picking, therefore, has become a daunting task in Nunavut.




Fig. 4 Evolution of the uses and functions of berry plants and berry picking through time represented by the time “on the land” and “in the community”

Figure 1 by Boulanger-Lapointe et al. (2019)

There is an indirect relationship between berry-picking and sewing and indigenous self-determination. Since the government of Nunavut relies on Canadian government's funds, it is unable to make developmental projects that can support adaptation and mitigation to empower women in berry-picking and sewing. The Canadian government has dedicated massive funds to adaptation in Nunavut (Labbé, 2017). Nonetheless, studies show that only 22% have been implemented (Labbé, 2017). Moreover, indigenous self-determination is useless without the local knowledge. Many Inuits reported that they are not consulted on important decisions even by the local government, which undermines self-determination (Ertman, 2023). In other words, just like in language, the Nunavut government is there, but is not consulting the locals. This means that there is both a problem of autonomy (resources) and lack of consultation.

Art in Cape Dorset and Pangnirtung

Art in Cape Dorset and Pangnirtung has been immensely shaped by recent climatic changes. The two are remote communities in Baffin Island, Nunavut (Rathwell, 2020). Cape Dorset's community describe the place as "the capital of Inuit art" (Rathwell, 2020). Culturally, art has been used by these communities' artists to send key messages related to family love, Inuit knowledge, forgiveness, etc. (Rathwell & Armitage, 2016). Nonetheless, climate change has shaped artists focus to climate change (Rathwell & Armitage, 2016). For example, some artists started drawing about "the ice [break] up on the flow edge and people boating much later" (Rathwell & Armitage, 2016). Likewise, one artist "noticed that when the sea ice melted, [she] began to draw a lot of belugas" (Rathwell & Armitage, 2016). Art has been also used to portray climatic problems to "Southerners" in exhibitions (Rathwell & Armitage, 2016).

Such findings fit within the literature on art and climate change. Nurmis argues that "during the last decade (2005–2015), artists from all over the world have taken on climate change as the subject matter of their work" (2016). Inuits, therefore, are no exception. Moreover, Inuit artists use art to raise Southerners' awareness of climate change in the north. This idea aligns with the literature that discusses the power of art in reshaping perceptions towards climate change (Bentz, 2020; Nurmis, 2016; Roosen, 2017).

There are weak linkages between Nunavut's self-determination, art, and climate change. The Nunavut government has an "Arts Funding Program" that theoretically supports Inuit artists in the region (Government of Nunavut, n.d). Amid the Covid-19 pandemic, the government

launched the Nunavut Public Art Initiative, which allow artists to receive a fund up to \$50k (CBC, 2020). However, details of the implementation of such a fund remain unknown. It is unclear whether such as fund required the federal government approval or not. Nonetheless, this initiative still shows the government of Nunavut's autonomy. If implemented, then the territorial government can play a major role in supporting artists.

Conclusion

This paper showed 6 main areas that climate change impact in Inuits' cultural life. These are hunting, fishing, berry-picking, sewing, art, and language. The paper also argued that although the government of Nunavut has autonomy, it still has constraints by the Canadian federal government, which exacerbates the impact of climate change on culture. This paper, however, has limitations. First, since it was written in February 2024, there was not time to analyse the new devolution agreement, which can make significant changes to Nunavut government. Second, it did not look into all cultural aspects, such as sports or mythology. This is mainly due to scarcity of sources and word limitation. Therefore, it is recommended to carry out future research that take these limitations into account.

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